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Imagery and the Self in Social Phobia 
Abstract 
Current cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
emphasise the importance of negative self-images in the maintenance of social 
phobia. Although evidence suggests that in social phobia these images influence 
some cognitive, affective and behavioural responses in social situations, it is unclear 
how they exert their effect. The literature review examines the proposition that these 
images function as self-representations that have their roots in autobiographical 
memory. The role of self-images, within a theoretical model of self and 
autobiographical memory is explored (i.e., the Self-Memory System; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). A possible relationship between self-images and the working 
self (i.e., the current self-view) is discussed as a useful framework within which the 
effects of negative self-images in social phobia could be understood. Research is 
proposed which will begin to empirically test this relationship. The empirical paper 
investigates the effect of positive and negative self-images on difference aspects of 
the self. Negative self-images were associated with a weaker positive implicit self-
esteem bias, and less positive and more negative explicit self-esteem, in both high 
and low socially anxious participants. Negative self-images were also associated with 
reduced self-concept clarity, but only in low socially anxious participants. Following 
social threat activation, the increase in self-esteem associated with positive self-
imagery was still evident. Findings provide some support for a relationship between 
self-imagery and specific self-evaluative components of the self. The potential 
contribution of this relationship to the persistence of social phobia is discussed.  
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Abstract  
Current cognitive models of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) highlight the role of spontaneous, negative and distorted images of 
the self in contributing to the negative sense of self at the heart of the disorder. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that these images exert an effect on a range of 
cognitive, affective and behavioural responses in social situations, which are 
implicated in the maintenance of social anxiety (e.g., Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 
2004). However, exactly how these images exert their effects is unclear. Within this 
review, images of self in social phobia are conceptualised as self-representations that 
have their roots in autobiographical memory. The role of self-images, within a 
theoretical model of self and autobiographical memory (i.e., the Self-Memory System; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) is explored. The relationship between self-images 
and the working self (i.e., the current self-view) is discussed as a potentially useful 
framework within which the effects of negative self-images in social phobia could be 
understood. However, further research exploring the relationship between imagery, 
the self and autobiographical memory is necessary before any conclusions can be 
drawn.  
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 Introduction 
Social phobia, or social anxiety disorder, is one of the most common anxiety 
disorders with reported lifetime prevalence rates as high as 24% in Europe (Fehm, 
Pelissolo, Furmark, & Wittchen, 2005). The disorder is characterised by a marked 
and enduring fear of social or performance situations in which the individual feels 
exposed to possible scrutiny by others (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000). Social phobia 
generally has its onset in adolescence, with a highly persistent course of symptoms 
impacting on everyday functioning in social, educational and occupational domains 
(Chartier, Hazen, & Stein, 1998; Fehm, Beesdo, Jacobi, & Fiedler, 2008; Fehm et al., 
2005). At the heart of the disorder is the experience of a negative sense of self, 
represented by the negative self-referent thoughts described by patients (e.g., Glass, 
Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Stopa & Clark, 1993). This negative self-view is 
also encapsulated for many by negative and distorted self-images.  
Negative images of the self are commonly reported in social phobia (e.g., 
Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; Hirsch, Clark, & Yiend, 2004)  and although 
the specific image experienced by each individual may be idiosyncratic, the meaning 
of the image is related to the core fears of negative evaluation, embarrassment and 
humiliation (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007). Within the cognitive models, these negative 
and distorted self-images contribute to the construction of the negative self-view that 
is important in maintaining social phobia (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Furthermore, an accumulating evidence base supports the 
influence of these images on specific cognitive, affective and behavioural responses 
implicated in the maintenance, and potentially even the development of social phobia 11 
 
(e.g., Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 
2003; Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004).  
To date, research has largely focused on exploring the nature and the effects 
of negative self-images in social phobia. There has been relatively little theoretical or 
empirical investigation of the potential mechanisms which may underpin their 
effects. It is only through developing an understanding of these mechanisms that 
images can be most effectively targeted within treatment. Exploring the relationship 
between image of self and autobiographical memory (e.g., as demonstrated in Day, 
Holmes, & Hackmann, 2004; Hackmann et al., 2000; Osman et al., 2004) may offer 
one possible explanation. Current cognitive models of social phobia (e.g., Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) emphasise the role of negative images as 
representation of self. The experience of self is critically defined by a knowledge 
base of autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and imagery 
in social phobia appears to, at least in part, have its roots in such a knowledge base 
(Hackmann et al., 2000). Therefore, exploring the potentially triadic relationship 
between imagery, autobiographical memory and the self, may usefully contribute to 
our understanding how negative self-images exert their effect in social phobia.  
Within this context, this review has several aims. To begin with, the function 
of negative images of the self within contemporary cognitive models of social phobia 
will be evaluated. Current knowledge regarding the role of negative self-images in 
social phobia will then be reviewed and gaps in the literature identified. Next, the 
relationship between images of the self and autobiographical memory will be 
evaluated. The Self-Memory System (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) will be 
introduced as a model within which the relationship between self, imagery and 12 
 
autobiographical memory can be explored. The relationship between imagery and the 
experience of self, highlighted within the model, will be discussed as a potentially 
useful framework within which the effects of negative self-images in social phobia 
could be understood. Implications for future research exploring how images may 
function in social phobia will then be explored.   
The Role of Imagery in Social Phobia: The Cognitive Models 
The cognitive models that have been most influential in furthering our 
understanding and treatment of social phobia are those of Clark and Wells (1995) 
and Rapee and Heimberg (1997). Both of these models implicate imagery in the 
maintenance of social anxiety, and although they share a number of similarities in 
their conceptualisations of self-imagery, there are also some unique differences. Each 
model will be briefly described here, with specific references to the maintaining role 
of imagery in social phobia.  
A central tenet of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model is that social anxiety is 
associated with an increase in self-focused attention and monitoring of one’s own 
performance. They propose that, on entering a social situation, the socially phobic 
individual becomes increasingly focused on the self. This self-focus is triggered by a 
series of appraisals about the perceived danger inherent in that particular situation. 
These appraisals are informed by the individual’s underlying assumptions about 
themselves and their social world. Assumptions regarding the excessively high 
standards required for adequate social performance, conditional beliefs concerning 
the (catastrophic) consequences of performing in a certain way, and unconditional 
negative beliefs about the self, all contribute to danger appraisals. Internal 
information, which is made more accessible by the increased self-focus, is then used 13 
 
to infer how the individual believes that he or she will appear to others. This process 
informs the experience of self in social interactions. Clark and Wells propose that, 
automatic and intrusive negative self-images, information derived from anxiety 
symptoms (i.e., feeling anxious is interpreted as looking anxious), and a “felt-sense” 
(Clark, 2001, p. 408) all contribute to the construction of the negative sense of self at 
the heart of social phobia. The individual, therefore, becomes trapped in a closed 
system in which evidence for fears is mostly self-generated and potentially 
contradictory evidence is less accessible. Within this closed system, images of the 
self both represent, and serve as evidence for these fears, and the images themselves 
are not updated. This process is hypothesised to maintain anxiety and to reinforce the 
negative view of self encapsulated in the image.  
The role of imagery, in Rapee and Heimberg’s (1999) model, is not 
significantly different from that of Clark and Wells (1995). Like Clark and Wells, 
they propose that imagery maintains social anxiety through the process of self-
focused attention. However, Rapee and Heimberg also specifically highlight the 
biased processing of external cues in contributing to the maintenance of social 
phobia. It is proposed that attentional resources are split between the monitoring of 
internal and external information (e.g., any perceived threat in the social 
environment). Rapee and Heiberg suggest that both types of information feed into the 
construction of the self-image. They propose that as the person with social phobia 
enters a social situation, he/she forms a mental representation of his or her external 
appearance and behaviour, as seen by the audience. This self-generated mental 
representation is a loosely integrated amalgam based on a variety of inputs including 
information retrieved from long-term memory (e.g., recollection of general 14 
 
appearance, prior experience in the situations), internal cues (e.g., physical 
symptoms) and external cues (e.g., audience feedback). Although, the (reduced) 
processing of external social cues has been acknowledged by Clark and McManus 
(2002), the role of self-focus and internally generated information, remains the main 
focus of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model. Additionally, unlike Rapee and Heimberg, 
Clark and Wells do not specifically discuss the nature of the inputs which may 
contribute to the construction of the negative self-image.  
Both models propose that the image represents how the individual believes 
they are viewed by others (i.e., the image is a representation of the self from an 
observer perspective). The fear of evaluation is a critical component of social phobia. 
This motivates the individual to try to predict the standards held by the observer, and 
to attempt to establish whether the internally generated mental representation of self 
matches these standards. However, as the mental representations of the self are 
already negatively biased, the person with social phobia is likely to predict failure, 
which creates further anxiety. The physiological, cognitive and behavioural aspects 
of anxiety and this negative mental representation of self influence and exacerbate 
each other in a vicious cycle.  
In both models, the negative images trigger safety behaviours that serve as 
attempts to prevent or minimise the feared catastrophe encapsulated in the image. 
Safety behaviours can be mental operations (e.g., rehearsing what to say), or they can 
be behavioural manoeuvres that are more obviously observed (e.g., covering the face 
to avoid perceived blushing being seen). These behaviours can contaminate social 
interactions and have the unintended consequences of making the individual appear 
distracted and preoccupied. This sometimes produces poorer performance and can be 15 
 
interpreted by others as lack of interest, or even dislike on the part of the individual 
with social phobia (Hirsch, Meynen et al., 2004). For example, an individual 
avoiding eye contact for fear of others observing their red face (as depicted in their 
self-image) may be viewed by others avoiding eye contact due to being uninterested 
in the social interaction.   
In summary, the cognitive models described here are consistent in their 
conceptualisation of the self as a negative internal representation. This self-
representation is linked to unconditional negative beliefs and dysfunctional 
assumptions regarding an inability to perform to a perceived social standard. Biased 
negative self-images occur spontaneously in social situations thereby contributing 
to, and reinforcing, the negative self-view.  Imagery transforms the self into an 
observable entity, whose characteristics the individual becomes aware of through 
the process of self-focused attention. Although the models differ slightly in terms of 
the way in the way the image is constructed, both propose that images of the self 
are an important factor in the persistence of social phobia.  The emphasis given to 
negative self-imagery in these models has stimulated a growing body of research 
investigating the role of imagery in social phobia. Available literature within the 
area will now be reviewed in order to establish an understanding of current 
knowledge and in order to identify gaps in the evidence base.  
The Role of Imagery in Social Phobia: The Evidence Base  
In order to ascertain current knowledge in the area, a literature search was 
carried out to identify all relevant articles. The findings from this search will be 
discussed below. The following electronic bibliographic databases were searched: 
AMED, CINAHL, EMBASE, MEDLINE, PsycINFO, British Nursing Index, and 16 
 
the Cochrane library. The following terms were searched for in the titles, abstracts, 
and in any subject heading fields in each database: (‘social anxiety’, ‘social 
phobia’) AND (‘image*
1’). The search aimed to identify all peer reviewed, English-
language published studies since 1985. Reference sections from pertinent studies 
were scrutinised for additional relevant articles and this process was repeated until 
it was felt that all relevant literature had been obtained. Initial searches produced a 
crude total of 390 (taking no account of duplication), and from an initial screening 
of abstracts for basic relevance, 31 papers were examined. Since the central 
research question was regarding images of the self in social phobia, studies in 
which imagery and social anxiety, or social phobia, were not the focus of the 
research, were excluded from the review (e.g., Lytwyn, 2006; Solomonova et al., 
2008). After the full text of these papers had been screened, 12 papers were 
identified and the findings of these studies are discussed below. The papers 
included in the review fell into two broad categories: those exploring the nature of 
imagery in social phobia, and those investigating the effect of imagery 
manipulation on specific areas of cognition, emotion, or behaviour.  
The Nature of Imagery in Social Phobia 
The four studies, examining the nature of imagery in social phobia 
(Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann et al., 1998; Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998; 
Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999) confirm that images of the self are an important 
characteristic of social phobia. The literature suggests that in comparison to non-
anxious control participants, socially anxious participants report significantly more 
spontaneous self-images in social situations (Hackmann et al., 1998). These images 
                                                           
1 * used to denote all words starting with the prefix (e.g., image, imagery, images) 17 
 
tend to be recurrent and self-focused (Hackmann et al., 2000); representative of the 
individual’s worst fears (Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann et al., 1998); reported 
from an observer-perspective, and characterised by a distorted and negative 
impression of the observable self (Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann et al., 1998; 
Wells et al., 1998; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999). Although the term ‘image’ 
generally carries with it the connotation of a visual experience, imagery can include 
other sensory modalities including bodily sensations, sounds and smells. Mental 
imagery has been defined as that which occurs when perceptual information is 
accessed from memory, giving rise to the experience of “seeing with the mind’s eye, 
hearing with the mind’s ear,  feeling with the mind’s skin and so on” (Kosslyn, 
Ganis, & Thompson, 2001, p. 4). In line with this definition, the self-images, 
reported in social phobia, span across several sensory domains; although the images 
reported in the literature to date are predominantly reported as visual experiences 
with accompanying bodily sensations. An additional finding, which will be discussed 
in more detail later, is that images of the self in social phobia appear to be, at least in 
part, rooted in autobiographical memory (Hackmann et al., 2000).  
The Effects of Negative Images of the Self in Social Phobia 
In general, research manipulating the emotional content of self-images 
supports a role for these images in the maintenance of social anxiety (Hirsch, Clark 
et al., 2003; Hirsch, Mathews, & Clark, 2007; Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & 
Morrison, 2003; Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison, 2006; Hirsch, 
Meynen et al., 2004; Spurr & Stopa, 2003; Stopa & Jenkins, 2007; Vassilopoulos, 
2005). Studies involving non-clinical populations with high levels of social anxiety 
have demonstrated that holding a negative self-image in mind during a social threat 18 
 
activation task (e.g., giving a speech or holding a conversation with a stranger) is 
associated with increased anxiety (Hirsch, Mathews et al., 2006; Hirsch, Meynen et 
al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005); increased use of safety behaviours (Hirsch, 
Meynen et al., 2004); poorer self and observer ratings of performance (Hirsch, 
Meynen et al., 2004); and an increased perception of bodily sensations 
(Vassilopoulos, 2005), compared to holding a positive self-image in mind. An 
increase in the frequency of negative thoughts and a greater belief in the validity of 
these thoughts has been linked to negative images of the self (Hirsch, Mathews et 
al., 2006). Highly socially anxious participants also rate these negative and 
distorted images as more representative of self, than positive images 
(Vassilopoulos, 2005). In addition to the research manipulating image content, one 
study specifically manipulated image perspective (i.e., images were generated from 
either an observer or a field, perspective) (Spurr & Stopa, 2003).  The observer-
perspective, which characterises negative self-images in social phobia (e.g., 
Hackmann et al., 2000), was associated with an increased frequency of negative 
thoughts and an increased use of safety behaviours when compared to the field-
perspective (Spurr & Stopa, 2003).  This finding provides support for the 
proposition that both image-content and image-perspective contribute to the effects 
of self-imagery in social phobia.  
None of the studies discussed so far included a control or neutral imagery 
condition, which makes it difficult to evaluate the specific source of the observed 
differences in image valence. For example, the differences in anxiety ratings between 
negative and positive images might be due to an increase in anxiety in response to a 
negative image, to a decrease in response to a positive image, or some combination 19 
 
of the two. Without a baseline, it is impossible to know which explanation is correct. 
Hirsch, Meynen et al. (2004) did include a control condition; however, the control 
image generated represented the self feeling relaxed in a social situation and 
therefore could represent a positive, rather than a control or neutral comparison 
image. An additional critique of the evidence base is that these studies used non-
clinical populations, which raises questions about generalisation to a socially phobic 
population. However, the literature search identified one study that measured the 
effects of manipulating self-imagery in participants with social phobia (i.e., Hirsch, 
Clark et al., 2003). The results from this study are consistent with those from 
research using non-clinical populations. Promisingly, the manipulation of positive 
self-images in social phobia was associated with lower levels of anxiety, the 
perception that anxiety was less visible to others, and better performance ratings by 
self and others, compared to the negative self-imagery that usually characterises the 
disorder. This suggests that the generation of positive images could be beneficial in 
the treatment of social phobia.  
There is some support for the potentially causal role of negative self-images 
in the development of social phobia. Hirsch, Mathews et al. (2006) found that 
confident public speakers holding in mind negative self-images whilst giving a 
speech reported increased anxiety, increased self-criticism of performance, more 
negative thoughts and increased belief in the validity of these thoughts, compared to 
those holding in mind positive self-images. However, when the effects of negative 
images were compared with neutral images (i.e., a shopping trip), only the effect of 
negative images on increased anxiety remained. The results suggest that in confident 
speakers negative self-images increase anxiety, but positive images do not reduce 20 
 
anxiety. There were no other differences in the effects of the positive or negative 
images, and neutral images. However, it would be interesting to explore the 
relationship between emotionally valenced self-images and neutral images in patients 
with social phobia. Within this population we might expect negative images, which 
are repeatedly activated and more entrenched, to exert a greater effect. Therefore, 
significant differences between neutral and negative images on variables other than 
anxiety may be observed.   
The relationship between negative self-images and anxiety in participants, 
who do not usually have anxiety problems, is consistent with the idea that these 
images are involved in the development of social phobia. However, the results of a 
study carried out by Vassilopoulos (2005), which also included a sample of low 
socially anxious participants, provided mixed support for this proposition. In contrast 
to Hirsch, Mathews et al. (2006), Vassilopoulos found no differences between 
positive and negative self-images on measures of anxiety or performance in low 
socially anxious participants. It is possible that differences in sample composition 
may have contributed to the different effects observed. Although both studies 
included low socially anxious participants, Vassilopoulos did not include participants 
who were pre-selected to represent confident public speakers as in Hirsch, Mathews 
et al. However, it is unclear how this could contribute to the different findings within 
these studies. Further studies including similar low socially anxious participants are 
needed to clarify the potential importance of negative images in the development of 
social phobia.  
The study of imagery has advanced and is now beginning to focus on 
investigating the potential interactions between imagery and other cognitive 21 
 
processes. Biases in memory, attention, and interpretation all contribute to the 
persistence of social phobia (see Heinrichs & Hofman, 2001; Hirsch & Clark, 2004, 
for a review). The literature search identified three studies that explored the 
relationship between imagery and two other cognitive biases: interpretation (Hirsch 
et al., 2007; Hirsch, Mathews et al., 2003) and autobiographical memory (Stopa & 
Jenkins, 2007). Firstly, evidence of a positive inferential bias (i.e., a bias towards 
non-threatening inferences in socially ambiguous situations) has been demonstrated 
in non-anxious individuals. However, high socially anxious individuals lack this 
positive inferential bias (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). Additionally, holding in 
mind a negative self-image blocks the positive inferential bias in non-socially 
anxious participants (Hirsch, Mathews et al., 2003). In individuals with social 
phobia, imagery could therefore be indirectly preventing access to information that 
could contradict negative perceptions of social performance. This may be one way in 
which imagery is indirectly maintaining social anxiety. Furthermore, recent evidence 
suggests that the relationship between imagery and inferential bias may reciprocal.  
Hirsch et al. (2007) demonstrated that participants trained to make negative 
interpretations of socially ambiguous events (i.e., inducing a negative inferential 
bias) generated more negative self-related images than those trained to make positive 
interpretations (Hirsch et al., 2007). This pattern of results was found even after 
controlling for levels of state anxiety. Taken together with Hirsch, Mathews, et al.’s 
(2003) earlier findings, the results suggests a reciprocal relationship between self-
imagery and inferential bias in social anxiety, which may contribute to the 
maintenance of social phobia.   22 
 
 Secondly, Stopa and Jenkins (2007) examined the relationship between self-
imagery and autobiographical memory in participants with high levels of social 
anxiety. This study evaluated whether holding a positive or negative self-image in 
mind during a speech would affect the retrieval of autobiographical memories in 
response to positive, negative and neutral cue words. Positive memories were 
retrieved more quickly in the positive imagery condition and negative memories 
were retrieved more quickly in the negative imagery condition. There was no 
difference between the latencies of memories retrieved in response to negative and 
neutral words, but positive memories took significantly longer to retrieve in the 
negative imagery condition. In this study, using the neutral word retrieval latencies 
as a baseline suggests that negative self-images had an inhibitory effect on the 
retrieval of positive autobiographical memories. Stopa and Jenkins suggest that given 
the recall of social memories is an important part of anticipatory and post-event 
processing then the inhibition of positive memories is likely to lead processing 
outside the social situation to become progressively more negative. This process 
could therefore ultimately maintain social anxiety. These three studies highlight the 
next step in furthering our understanding of the potential maintaining role of imagery 
in social anxiety; specifically, the idea that imagery may, in part, exert its effects 
through interactions with other cognitive processes implicated in the persistence of 
social phobia (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006).  
Directions for Future Research 
In summary, negative images of the self appear to be an integral part of the 
experience of social phobia. Evidence supports their role in the maintenance of the 
disorder through their ability to influence the socially phobic individual’s affective, 23 
 
cognitive and behavioural responses in social situations. Reviewing the literature has 
highlighted a number of avenues for future research which would potentially further 
our understanding of the role of imagery in the maintenance, and even the 
development of social phobia.  
Initial evidence suggests a similar pattern of results between clinical and non-
clinical populations. However, more research is needed using participants with social 
phobia to enable current findings to be generalised. Additionally, it is important to 
begin to disentangle the effects of positive and negative self-imagery. It is necessary 
to establish a neutral imagery condition which acts as a baseline against which the 
effects of positive and negative images can be compared. The image of the shopping 
trip used by Hirsch, Mathews et al. (2006) as a neutral image may not be appropriate 
to use with highly socially anxious participants. A shopping trip represents a social 
situation and as such may function as a negative image for anxious participants. 
Using an object image (e.g., a ball) may be more representative of a neutral image 
across high, medium and low socially anxious groups, especially in comparison to 
positive and negative images of the self. Establishing the relative contributions of 
positive and negative self-imagery has important implications for the way in which 
images are targeted within treatment. For example, although the difference in anxiety 
associated with positive and negative imagery highlights the beneficial effects of 
targeting negative images, it remains unclear how these images could be most 
effectively targeted. If these differences are solely due to the detrimental effects of 
negative images, then neutralising or eliminating these images may be useful in 
therapy. However, if positive images lead to a reduction in anxiety, then modifying 
negative self-images and constructing positive images of the self may be beneficial 24 
 
in treatment. However, this may be potentially more challenging in patients who 
have a prevailing negative social self-view. 
The continued exploration of the potentially causal role of imagery in social 
phobia is also important given the limited number of published studies and the mixed 
findings. If negative images have a causal role, we would expect that holding in mind 
a negative self-image during a social interaction would have adverse consequences, 
even for individuals who are not normally prone to social anxiety. One way to test 
this hypothesis would be to ask participants with social phobia, as well as those who 
report high, medium and low levels of social anxiety, to hold in mind positive, 
negative and neutral images, and to measure aspects of behaviour, affect and 
cognition proposed to maintain social anxiety (e.g., anxiety, performance, frequency 
of negative thoughts). If negative images have a casual role, the direction of the 
effects observed across anxiety groups could be similar. However, we might expect 
the magnitude of differences between positive and negative images to be positive 
correlated with reported levels of social anxiety. Negative images are likely to be 
more entrenched in participants with higher levels of social anxiety and therefore 
may exert a more powerful effect within this group.  
Future research should continue to explore the interactions between imagery 
and other cognitive processes. This would further our understanding of the 
underlying processes contributing to the persistence of social phobia and could 
inform more effective treatment protocols. For example, if biased cognitive 
processes work together to maintain social phobia, it may be necessary to target these 
processes together in therapy in order to facilitate clinical change (Hirsch, Clark et 
al., 2006). It would be interesting to explore whether the relationship between 25 
 
imagery and autobiographical memory, observed by Stopa and Jenkins (2007), is 
reciprocal. There is some evidence to suggest the presence of a negative bias in the 
retrieval of memories in response to social threat-related cues (Wenzel & Cochran, 
2006). In line with this evidence and the proposal that memory processes contribute 
to the construction of self-images in social phobia (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), biased 
memory processes could contribute to the negative nature of the self-image 
experienced in social phobia. One way to test this hypothesis might be to introduce a 
bias in memory processes (e.g., participants could be trained to retrieve positive, 
negative or neutral autobiographical memories) and then ask participants to generate 
images of self. If the relationship is reciprocal, then the biased retrieval of negative 
memories may be associated with the construction of more negatively valenced 
images than the retrieval of positive or neutral memories. Conversely, the retrieval of 
positive memories may be associated with more positively valenced images than 
negative or neutral images.  
Finally, to date, both the theoretical models and the research have largely 
focused on describing the presence, nature and the effects of the negative imagery 
experienced in social phobia. However, exactly how these images exert their effects 
continues to remain unclear. One possible answer may lie in the fact that these 
images function as representations of self. Given that current cognitive models of 
social phobia emphasise the role of images as self-representations (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), it is perhaps surprising that this proposition has not 
yet been examined within the published literature. The remaining part of this paper 
will therefore focus on exploring the relationship between imagery and self and will 26 
 
discuss the way in which this could inform our understanding of how images may 
exert their effect in social phobia.  
How do Negative Images Affect the Self? 
If images do function as representations of the self in social phobia, exploring 
the relationship between images and the self is critical. What defines the experience 
of self is a complex issue. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose that an 
individual’s sense of self is constructed from a knowledge base of autobiographical 
memories and autobiographical knowledge (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Autobiographical memory and self are, according to Conway and Pleydell Pearce, 
inextricably linked within a Self-Memory System (SMS). If this is the case, then the 
negative images in social phobia might function as part of this SMS, and accessing 
these images could directly influence the individual’s experience of self.  This 
proposition is in line with Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive model of social 
phobia, in which autobiographical memory is implicated in the construction of self-
images. The potentially triadic relationship between self, autobiographical memory 
and imagery could therefore usefully inform our understanding of how self-images 
exert their effect in social phobia.  
In order to explore how imagery might function within the SMS, an 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between autobiographical memory 
and self is necessary. The SMS, as first conceptualised by Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce (2000) and elaborated on by Conway, Singer and Tagini (2004), is a very 
comprehensive theoretical model and it is not possible to explore it in detail here. 
However, a brief overview, which reviews the elements that may be of specific 27 
 
relevance to a potential relationship between imagery, autobiographical memory and 
self, is given below.  
The Working Self 
According to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), the SMS stores many 
different types of information about the self (e.g., knowledge about life time periods, 
memories about general events, and memories of specific autobiographical events). 
This information provides the knowledge base from which different self-
representations are constructed. A critical component of the SMS is the concept of 
the working self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), which represents a complex 
hierarchy of interlocked goals and sub-goals. These goals represent a subset of 
working memory control processes organised into interconnected goal hierarchies. 
The goals of the working self motivate the generation of plans, actions, and the 
encoding and retrieval of memories congruent with one’s current needs (Conway & 
Holmes, 2004; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer et al., 2004). 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce draw an analogy between the working self and working 
memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Working memory contains information currently 
being used or manipulated by the memory store. In the same way, the working self 
provides the individual with access to the self-knowledge (e.g., beliefs, attitudes and 
memories) that is needed in any given context or situation (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). The notion that not everything about the self is in awareness at any 
one time suggests that multiple different self-representations exist, all of which have 
the potential to inform the overall experience of self.  
The negative sense of self that is characteristic in social phobia may represent 
just one of the social phobic’s working self concepts, all of which have the potential 28 
 
to be activated or accessible in social situations. This is in line with Brewin’s (2006) 
retrieval competition account, in which he proposes that multiple representations of 
self exist in memory and compete for retrieval in any given situation. Brewin argues 
that self-representations consist of numerous semantic and episodic memories, 
together with desired and feared attributes of self. In this framework, the different 
representations compete for retrieval and factors such as rehearsal, the availability of 
specific retrieval cues, and the distinctiveness and valence of representations 
determine which representation is successfully retrieved (see Brewin, 2006). The 
existence of multiple representations of self and the activation of negative 
representations in social situations is also consistent with Clark and Wells’ (1995) 
proposition that the negative self-schemas experienced in social phobia are unstable. 
They argue that these self-schemas are activated by anticipating, participating in, or 
ruminating on social interactions.  
Within the SMS framework, it is possible that the negative images of the self 
reported in social phobia function as one form of self-representation that is highly 
accessible in social situations. These images could therefore contribute to the 
construction of the individual’s working self in social situations. Within the SMS, the 
power of these images lies in their relationship to self and autobiographical memory. 
As noted above, a theoretical relationship between imagery and memory is described 
by Rapee and Heimberg (1997) within their model of social phobia. However, is 
there any evidence to support the existence of this relationship? The following 
section addresses this question.  
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Autobiographical Memory and Imagery 
There is only one published study that directly evaluates the validity of Rapee 
and Heimberg’s (1997) proposition. Hackmann et al. (2000) interviewed 22 
participants all of whom had a diagnosis of social phobia. They all reported 
experiencing recurrent and negative spontaneous images of self that were relatively 
stable across time and feared situations. Critically, all but one participant felt that 
these images were linked to a memory of earlier aversive social events (e.g., 
bullying, criticism and humiliation), clustered in time around the onset or worsening 
of their disorder. Memories and images reported in this study were linked in both 
theme and content. For example, one participant described herself in her image as 
sitting at a table, looking nervous and smaller than she was as an adult. In the linked 
memory, she was sitting at the tea table being criticized by her father. Although 
when specifically asked, participants were able to link current images with past 
memories, these links were not held in conscious awareness; participants did not 
generally report recollection of these memories when images were triggered. It is 
possible that the repeated activation of the images over the years may have resulted 
in participants forgetting the original events that triggered the image (Hackmann et 
al., 2000). This could then reinforce the validity of the image as an accurate 
reflection of the current self.  
The results of this study are consistent with the proposition that unpleasant 
social experiences may lead individuals with social phobia to develop a negative 
image of the social self, which is repeatedly activated in social situations, and is 
relatively resistant to change (Hackmann et al., 2000). Hirsch, Clark et al. (2006) 
suggest that these images may not simply represent veridical sensory data, but they 30 
 
can also contain interpretations of the event that were made at the time. Therefore, 
these images may not directly correspond to observed reality. In social phobia, where 
interpretations are negatively biased in social situations (e.g., Stopa & Clark, 2000), 
the resulting image-memory may therefore represent a distorted and negatively 
biased picture of the original event. This is consistent with the negative and distorted 
nature of the images reported in social phobia (Hackmann et al., 1998).  
There are no other published studies evaluating the relationship between 
imagery and autobiographical memory in social phobia. This limits the conclusions 
which can be drawn and further research utilising larger sample sizes is essential. 
However, there is an emerging evidence base that supports the relationship between 
imagery and autobiographical memory across a range of other clinical disorders. In 
post-traumatic stress disorder there is a clear autobiographical precipitant and the re-
experiencing of the trauma through intrusive imagery is a central feature of the 
disorder (APA, 2000). Furthermore, evidence suggests that distressing negative 
imagery is a feature of many other clinical disorders including agoraphobia (Day et 
al., 2004), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Speckens, Hackmann, Ehlers, & Cuthbert, 
2007), body dysmorphic disorder (Osman et al., 2004), and psychosis (Morrison et 
al., 2002). Within all the studies quoted, the images reported by the majority of 
patients either represented actual memories of traumatic events, or were closely 
linked in content to the memories of such events. This emerging trend across a range 
of clinical disorders provides some indirect support for the argument that the 
relationship between distressing imagery and autobiographical memory is important 
in social phobia.  31 
 
The memories associated with the distressing images across the range of 
clinical disorders appeared to represent self-defining moments in the individual’s 
life, potentially representing specific self-defining memories (see Singer & Salovey, 
1993). A self-defining memory is a highly significant personal memory that can be 
characterised by the following properties: it is vivid and evokes strong emotion at the 
time of recollection, it is repeatedly accessed and linked to other similar memories, 
and is connected to an enduring personal concern or unresolved conflict (Singer & 
Salovey, 1993). The memories described within the research above appeared to 
capture critical points within the lives of the participants; specifically representing a 
point in time when their difficulties either began or worsened (Day et al., 2004; 
Hackmann et al., 2000; Speckens et al., 2007). Conway et al. (2004) suggest that 
memories of negative self-defining moments can be aversive. This may lead the 
individual to avoid thinking about or processing these memories, leaving little 
opportunity for them to find a place within the structure of autobiographical memory. 
Memories of such highly self-relevant events remain in a state of high accessibility 
and are among the first to come to mind when a period in the past is freely sampled 
(Conway & Holmes, 2004). According to Conway (2005) these highly accessible 
memories provide the major active content of the self and it is from this knowledge 
that self-images emerge.  
If negative self-images in social phobia and the memories on which they are 
based, represent such self-defining moments, then they could be highly sensitive to 
activation and triggered automatically by relevant cues with the potential to disrupt 
functioning. This proposition is in line with patients’ reports of the spontaneous and 
intrusive nature of the self-imagery experienced in social phobia (Hackmann et al., 32 
 
1998). It is also consistent with reports from highly socially anxious participants’, of 
the intrusive and disruptive nature of images (i.e., interfering with concentration) 
associated with past anxiety provoking social events (Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & 
Shafran, 2000).  However, research exploring the specific self-defining qualities of 
the memories reported in social phobia (e.g., affective intensity, vividness, high 
levels of rehearsal, linkage to similar memories and connection to an enduring 
concern or unresolved conflict; Singer & Moffitt, 1991; Singer & Salovey, 1993) 
would clarify whether the autobiographical memories associated with negative self-
images do formally constitute self-defining memories. Qualitative analysis of the 
thematic content of the memories and associated images reported in social phobia 
would provide a useful insight into their nature.  
There is indirect support for both the importance of self-defining memories 
and for the link between images and these memories, in two studies that have used 
imagery rescripting as part of a treatment programme for social phobia (see Wild, 
Hackmann, & Clark, 2007, 2008). Imagery rescripting involves a set of related 
procedures in which patients revisit their image-associated traumatic memory in a 
number of stages (including re-experiencing of the memory and image, cognitive 
restructuring and rescripting of the earlier traumatic memory). Preliminary results 
from these studies indicate that the process of imagery rescripting can lead to a 
significant improvement in negative self-beliefs, image and memory distress and 
vividness, fear of negative evaluation, and anxiety in feared social situations (Wild et 
al., 2007, 2008). The association between rescripting memories and a reduction in 
the distress associated with the intrusive imagery is promising because it suggests 33 
 
that changing significant (and possibly self-defining) memories may have a role in 
improving treatment outcome in social phobia.  
In summary, evidence from a number of different sources supports the 
proposition that there is an important relationship between distressing imagery and 
autobiographical memory in social phobia. This evidence, together with the 
relationship between self and autobiographical memory described by Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000), suggests that our understanding of how images exert their 
effects in social phobia may be usefully facilitated by exploring the relationship 
between imagery and self within the SMS framework. However, first we need to 
explore the mechanisms that underpin the relationship between autobiographical 
memory and self. Therefore, in the next section the SMS model will be briefly 
introduced and the way in which autobiographical memory and the working self may 
interact to contribute to the experience of self will be discussed.  
Autobiographical Memory and the Working Self 
A critical feature of the SMS is that all cognition is goal driven. The working 
self draws on autobiographical knowledge and memory to set and constrain current 
goals (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer et al., 2004). Current goals 
are constrained by past experience and cannot contradict stored autobiographical 
knowledge. For example, the goal of becoming an Olympic swimmer could not 
reasonably be set or maintained if the individual can only recall memories related to 
a fear of water.  In the same way that goals cannot contradict knowledge, the 
working self operates to ensure that accessed knowledge cannot contradict active 
goals. The working self facilitates the availability of knowledge and memories that 
confirm and reinforce current conceptions of self that are highly accessible (see 34 
 
McAdams, 2001, for a review). This may be through influencing the initial encoding 
of knowledge or through the retrieval and memory construction process (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer et al., 2004). Knowledge that contradicts the 
active goal structure may be prevented from influencing it, or, when accessed, the 
knowledge may be edited, distorted or changed in some other way (Conway & 
Holmes, 2004). To elaborate on the example above, if autobiographical knowledge 
contains a mixture of positive and negative experiences of swimming performance, 
then knowledge of success may be facilitated and combined into accessible memory, 
and knowledge of failures may be inhibited or distorted.  
The mechanism described above is conceptualised as the principle of self 
coherence and is fundamental to the stability of the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer et al., 2004). Discrepancies between the goals of the 
working self and available autobiographical knowledge indicate a breakdown in 
normal functioning that may lead the SMS to enter a pathological state (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Discrepancies challenge the goal structure of the working 
self resulting in tension within the SMS and instability in the experience of self. 
Maintaining coherence within the system is therefore a critical underlying function of 
the working self (Conway, 2005). One of the fundamental functions of 
autobiographical memory and autobiographical knowledge appears to be directly 
informing the goals of the working self and contributing to this coherence of self. 
The whole system is goal driven, and therefore, if images do have a function within 
this system, then it is likely that they too will have a relationship with goals. The 
possible relationship between imagery and goals within the SMS will be discussed 
next.  35 
 
Imagery, Goals and the Working Self 
Within the SMS, autobiographical memories are primarily conceptualised as 
records of goal attainment or goal failure (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Therefore, images deriving directly from such memories probably represent specific 
goal states (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). One possibility is that the negative 
self-images reported in social phobia represent records of goal failure. Although 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) do not specifically discuss the nature of the 
goals within the SMS, they do propose that theoretical approaches that focus on the 
control of self-discrepancies can usefully further our understanding (e.g., Higgins, 
1987). In Higgins’ theory of self and affect, the self is separated into three domains: 
the actual self (represented by a set of attributes that you believe you actually 
possess), the ideal self (what the self aspires to be), and the ought self (the self one 
should be, as specified by significant persons and society in general). According to 
self-discrepancy theory, different experiences of negative affect arise from perceived 
discrepancies between these different selves.  
Conway and colleagues propose that the need to reduce discrepancies may be 
a useful way of understanding the goals of the self system (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). In social phobia, discrepancies between actual and ought selves are 
characteristic (e.g., Alden & Wallace, 1991; Strauman, 1989; Weilage & Hope, 
1999) and are associated with negative emotions such as agitation and fear (e.g., 
Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Strauman, 1996; Strauman & Higgins, 
1987). They appear to represent the individual’s belief that his or her social 
performance will not meet the performance standards expected by the others (e.g., 
Weilage & Hope, 1999). Negative self-images that depict the individual’s worst fears 36 
 
regarding their performance may therefore visually represent a failure to reduce 
discrepancies between actual and ought selves.  
The specific role of imagery, and the relationship between imagery and goals, 
has been the subject of some theoretical debate (see Conway, Meares et al., 2004), 
although this is largely an area of emerging interest. Conway, Meares et al. (2004) 
propose that images represent information about goals that cannot be directly or 
consciously accessed. Therefore, when an image or a set of images is accessed, 
important goal information becomes available. This information has the potential to 
influence the goals of the working self, and subsequently, to influence current 
processing. The role of images within the SMS is discussed in terms of their function 
in self-regulatory feedback loops (see Carver & Scheier, 1982, for a review of self-
regulatory feedback loops). In a negative feedback loop, the overall function is to 
reduce the perceived deviation from a comparison value (Carver & Scheier, 1982). 
Conway, Meares et al. (2004) propose that the goals and sub-goals of the SMS are 
largely made up of these negative discrepancy-reducing feedback loops that motivate 
behaviour, affect and cognition. In these feedback loops, the goal state (i.e., the 
comparison value) represents a state of the world to be achieved. Therefore, the 
actual perceived state of the world is compared to this goal state, and if a discrepancy 
is detected, plans are put into place to reduce it. The need to reduce discrepancies is 
proposed as a primary goal of the SMS (Conway, Meares et al., 2004).  Negative 
imagery provides a challenge to this goal and thus creates conflict and instability 
within the system (Conway, Meares et al., 2004). The content of negative self-
images reported in clinical disorders, such as social phobia, are proposed to represent 
states of the world to be avoided (Conway, Meares et al., 2004; Dadds, Hawes, 37 
 
Schaefer, & Vaka, 2004). This is consistent with the earlier proposition that images 
could function as visual representations of discrepancies between actual and ought 
selves.  
Within the SMS framework, negative images may function as the goal state 
(i.e., the comparator value) within discrepancy-enhancing positive feedback loops 
(Conway, Meares et al., 2004). As such, the goal is to increase the discrepancy 
between the image state and the actual perceived state of the world. The 
unconstrained nature of these positive feedback loops is one of the factors underlying 
the power and the distressing nature of negative images in clinical disorders 
(Conway, Meares et al., 2004). These systems are unbounded. The goal is to simply 
avoid the image state, and therefore there is no pre-defined end point at which the 
goal is reached. The image and the actual state of the world can never perfectly 
match
2 and therefore, the goal can never be fully achieved.  
Within the SMS, goal processing gives rise to emotion (Oatley, 1992) and 
emotions are conceptualised as the way in which the individual experiences progress 
in goal processing (Conway, Meares et al., 2004). Therefore, the experience of goal 
failure and the unbounded goals represented in positive feedback loops might 
increase tension within the SMS and intensify the experience of negatively toned 
emotions. During periods of instability and tension, the self is less capable of 
operating effectively upon the world and is more vulnerable to external stressors 
(Conway, 2005). Negative images of the self in social phobia may therefore function, 
                                                           
2 This is in contrast to negative feedback loops where the referent, e.g., the image state, represents a 
state of the world to be achieved and as such represents a defined end point.  38 
 
within the SMS, as representations of goal failure that have the ability to influence 
the goals of the working self and give rise to the experience of negative affect.  
In summary, the negative images experienced in many clinical disorders 
could represent goal-states to be avoided. Activation of these images provides the 
working self with access to specific goal information (i.e., the goal of avoidance and 
discrepancy enhancement), which influences the goals of the working self, which in 
turn influences the specific experience of cognition, affect and behaviour.  
How do Negative Self-Images Exert Their Effect? 
How can the relationship between imagery, self and autobiographical 
memory described above contribute to our understanding of how negative self-
images exert their effects in social phobia? Within the SMS framework, an image 
may function as one form of self-representation, which when activated, has the 
potential to influence the working self (i.e., the view of self that is currently active 
which encapsulated current goals). If the working self is ultimately responsible for 
the generation of plans, actions, and the encoding and retrieval of memories (e.g., 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and if images of the self feed into the working 
self, then activation of these images may initiate specific processes and behaviours 
which may be involved in the maintenance of social anxiety (e.g., increased use of 
safety behaviours, the quicker retrieval of negative autobiographical memories). 
However, this proposition requires rigorous empirical investigation. Conceptualising 
self-images within the SMS framework leads to a number of testable hypotheses, 
which, if empirically validated would provide some support for the proposition 
above. In the final section of this paper some of these hypotheses will be discussed, 
along with a number of avenues for future research. The aim is to stimulate further 39 
 
thinking within the area and to provide a starting point from which research can 
evolve. 
Do Negative Images of the Self Influence the Experience of Self? 
If negative images of the self function as one form of representation (rooted 
in autobiographical memory), then like autobiographical knowledge, these images 
could contribute to the construction of the individual’s working self. Images of self 
are just one form of self-representation. If these images function within the SMS 
framework where self-coherence ultimately motivates cognition, then their activation 
could be associated with the facilitation of other negatively valenced representations 
of self, or indeed with the inhibition of more positively valenced representations. 
Conversely, positive images of the self may inhibit negatively valenced 
representations and facilitate more positive representations of self. If this is true, then 
negative images may reinforce a negative and maladaptive self-view by influencing 
the accessibility of other internally accessible self-related information. The 
importance of this information in feeding into the individual’s self-view is likely to 
be emphasised by the process of increased self-focused attention (Clark & Wells, 
1995).   
To date, there are no published studies examining the relationship between 
imagery and the self in social phobia. However, the experience of self in social 
phobia has been the target of research. For example, low levels of positive implicit 
and explicit self-esteem (e.g., Bouvard et al., 1999; Tanner, Stopa, & De Houwer, 
2006), more negative ratings of self-attributes (e.g., Moscovitch, Orr, Rowa, Reimer, 
& Antony, 2009), and specific schematic themes (e.g., social 
undesirability/defectiveness; Pinto-Gouveia, Castilho, Galhardo, & Cunha, 2006) all 40 
 
appear to characterise the negative sense of self at the heart of the disorder. 
Therefore, in beginning to evaluate the relationship between imagery and the self, a 
useful place to start may be to ask participants to hold differently valenced self-
images in mind and measure active aspects of the self (i.e., the working self) such as 
those highlighted above. If negative images function in the way proposed, negative 
self-images could be associated with more negative representations of self (e.g., as 
represented by lower levels of self-esteem or more negative ratings of self-attributes) 
compared to positive self-images. The inclusion of participants reporting both high 
and low levels of social anxiety would allow exploration of the potential role of 
negative imagery in both the development and persistence of a negatively valenced 
self-view.  
What defines self and how we measure working self is a complex issue 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, arguments highlighting an overreliance on 
specific components of self such as self-schema (Luke & Stopa, 2009) suggest a 
need to expand the study of self in future research. For example, literature on the self 
is beginning to distinguish between the content of self (e.g., who am I? how do I feel 
about myself?) and the structure of self (e.g., how the self-content is organised) (e.g., 
Campbell et al., 1996). Therefore, researchers may need to consider this distinction 
when designing studies that explore the imagery and the self in social phobia.  
Do Negative Images of the Self Represent Information About Goals? 
Within the SMS framework images are conceptualised as goal states; with 
negative self-images representing information about past goal failures. These 
negative images are described as discrepancy-enhancing and depict situations or 
experiences that should be avoided. One suggestion is that they represent past 41 
 
failures to align actual and ought views of self. In contrast, positive images are 
described as discrepancy-reducing, thus representing states of the world to be 
achieved. One way to test the relationship between the negative self-images and self-
discrepancies would be to ask individuals with social phobia, or those reporting high 
levels of social anxiety, to hold in mind positive, negative and neutral images of the 
self and to measure levels of self-discrepancies. In line with the self-discrepant 
nature of negative images described by Conway, Meares et al. (2004), negative 
images of the self could be associated with higher levels of self-discrepancies than 
positive or neutral images; potentially higher levels of discrepancies may exist 
between actual and ought selves. Additionally given the suggestion that negative 
images function similarly across diagnoses (Conway, Meares et al., 2004), it would 
be useful to explore the potentially self-discrepant nature of imagery across a range 
of clinical disorders (e.g., agoraphobia, body dysmorphic disorder). At a more 
general level, qualitative analysis of the themes encapsulated within these images 
and how these themes relate to the individual’s personal goals may also provide 
useful insights into the potentially goal-related nature of images in social phobia and 
other clinical disorders.  
Do Negative Images of the Self Influence Affect and Behaviour? 
If negative self-images do represent discrepancy-enhancing goal information, 
then they may influence affect and behaviour through their ability to make this 
specific goal information available to the working self. Negative self-images may 
influence the experience of anxiety by providing access to discrepancy-enhancing 
information, which challenges the stability of the self system. Additionally, if 
negative self-images represent the goal of avoidance, then these images are likely to 42 
 
influence the generation of plans and specific behavioural responses in social 
situations. The increased use of safety behaviours in social phobia that has been 
associated with negative self-imagery (e.g., Hirsch, Meynen et al., 2004) could be 
conceptualised as an attempt to avoid the image state by increasing the discrepancy 
between the image state and the perceived state of the world.  For example, an 
individual experiencing an image of him or herself as visibly red and shaking, may 
seek to avoid eye contact, keep their face covered, tightly grip on to items in their 
possession or even leave the situation completely. All these behaviours could 
represent an attempt to stop others from noticing what they perceive to be their 
appearance and thus act as a way of increasing the discrepancy between the image 
and actual-state of the world. As highlighted, the current evidence base supports the 
relationship between negative self-images and increased anxiety, and the increased 
use of safety behaviours in highly socially anxious participants (e.g., Hirsch, Meynen 
et al., 2004). The relationship between imagery and goals may provide a framework 
within which this relationship can be understood.  
Do Negative Images of the Self Influence Memory Processes? 
As discussed earlier, the working self is responsible for the encoding, 
construction and retrieval of autobiographical memories. Therefore, if negative self-
images do influence the goals of the working self, then they could indirectly 
influence memory processes. Consistent with the overall goal of self-coherence, 
negative self-images could be associated with the inhibition of positive, and the 
facilitation of negative, autobiographical memories. Additionally, information may 
also be subject to biased processing at encoding. Negative images may be associated 
with a self-congruent bias for the encoding of more threat-related or negative self-43 
 
related information. Evidence demonstrating selective attention to socially threat-
related information in participants with social phobia is consistent with this 
proposition (e.g., Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990). Negative images of 
the self may therefore maintain a negative self view by minimising the accessibility 
of incongruent (i.e., positive) information and facilitating the accessibility of 
congruent (i.e., negative) information. Stopa and Jenkins (2007) provided some 
support for this idea when they noted an inhibitory effect of negative self-images on 
the retrieval of positive autobiographical memories. However, with only one 
published study within this area, the conclusions which can be drawn are limited and 
further research is needed.   
There are a number of experimental paradigms that capture autobiographical 
memory processes that could be usefully employed to explore the interaction 
between imagery and memory. For example, in order to evaluate potential biases 
within the retrieval process, future studies could explore the effect of holding in mind 
differently valenced images of self on factors such as speed of memory recall in 
response to positive, negative, and neutral cue words (e.g., a standard 
autobiographical memory task as used by Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Open-ended 
recall tasks could be employed to assess potential biases on free recall. Inclusion of a 
social threat task, which is associated with the activation of a prevailing negative 
self-view (Clark & Wells, 1995), would usefully recreate a situation in which these 
biased memory processes are most likely to occur. If negative self-images function in 
line with the SMS goal of self-coherence, then they could lead to the faster retrieval 
of negative autobiographical memories, and these memories would be recalled more 
often than positive or neutral autobiographical memories. Conversely, positive 44 
 
memories could be retrieved more quickly and more often than negative or neutral 
memories.  
Do Positive Images of the Self Have Beneficial Effects in Social Phobia? 
An important point arising from this account of how images may function is 
that if images do influence the working self, then positive images may have 
potentially beneficial effects in social phobia. The current evidence base provides 
some support for this proposition with a number of studies demonstrating the relative 
benefits of holding positive compared to negative images in mind, e.g., lower levels 
of anxiety, reduced use of safety behaviours, and higher ratings of performance by 
self and others (e.g., Hirsch, Meynen et al., 2004). However, as previously stated, 
future research should include neutral imagery conditions in order to assess the 
specific contribution of positive imagery in highly socially anxious participants.  
Helping patients with social phobia to construct more positive images of the 
self in treatment (e.g., imagery rescripting; Wild et al., 2007, 2008) could be 
conceptualised as an attempt to increase the accessibility of more positive 
autobiographical knowledge and more positive self-representations, and to reduce the 
accessibility of more negative knowledge and negative self-representations.  This 
proposition is consistent with Brewin’s (2006) retrieval competition account of 
cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT). Brewin argues that altering the relative 
accessibility of self-representations (creating and increasing the accessibility of more 
positive representations) may underpin clinical change in CBT (see Brewin, 2006 for 
a full review of the retrieval competition hypothesis). The accessibility of this more 
positively valenced self-knowledge could potentially challenge the persistent 
negative view of self in social phobia. This may contribute to the construction of a 45 
 
more functional and adaptive working self and potentially a reduction in social 
anxiety. As highlighted earlier, the relationship between imagery and other 
representations of self requires empirical investigation. However, the relationship 
between self-view and social anxiety has gained some support from Hofmann, 
Moscovitch, Kim, and Taylor (2004) who demonstrated that reductions in negative 
self-perception
3 following treatment for social phobia were significantly correlated 
with reductions in social anxiety.  
Furthermore, in line with the discussion above, the development of more 
positive self-enhancing images could also be understood as an attempt to replace 
discrepancy-enhancing goals (e.g., things to be avoided) with discrepancy-reducing 
goals (e.g., things to be achieved) (Conway, Meares, et al., 2004). These 
discrepancy-reducing goals may then function to maintain the stability of the self 
system and contribute to the reduction in anxiety observed when participants hold in 
mind positive self-images (e.g., Hirsch, Clark et al., 2003). One way to begin to 
explore this proposition may be to measure self-discrepancies prior to, and following 
treatments, which aim to modify the nature of the self-images experienced in social 
phobia. Conway and colleagues’ (Conway, Meares et al., 2004) proposal indicates 
that in treatments where negative images are replaced with more positive images, a 
reduction in the experience of self-discrepancies should result. 
A number of CBT programmes include techniques that aim to modify 
negative and distorted images of the self (e.g., Clark et al., 2003; Clark & Wells, 
1995; Heimberg & Becker, 2002; Stangier, Heidenreich, Peitz, Lauterbach, & Clark, 
                                                           
3 Changes in negative self-perception were defined by a reduction in frequency of negative self-
referent thoughts.  46 
 
2003). However, such techniques have generally only been evaluated as part of a 
wider treatment programme including other cognitive and/or behavioural elements. 
Furthermore, with the exception of preliminary investigations into the effectiveness 
of imagery rescripting, research studies do not generally measure the effect of 
treatment programmes on patients’ experience of imagery. Therefore, at present, it is 
not possible to evaluate whether treatments actually do influence the images they aim 
to modify, or whether modification of these images is associated with improvements 
in clinical symptomology. In order to assess these propositions it would be valuable 
to begin to evaluate the individual’s experience of imagery (e.g., frequency, content, 
associated distress, and vividness of any imagery experienced) as a specific outcome 
measure of treatment. Additionally, dismantling studies may be a useful means of 
exploring the effect of specific imagery modification procedures on clinical 
symptomology. 
Conclusion 
Spontaneous negative and distorted images of the self appear to influence a 
range of cognitive, affective and behavioural responses which are implicated in the 
maintenance of social phobia. However, how these images exert their influence is as 
yet unclear. The relationship between images, self and autobiographical memory 
suggests the utility of drawing on theoretical models of self and memory to further 
our understanding. Within this paper, the SMS as described by Conway and 
colleagues (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer et al., 2004) has been 
presented as a framework within which the effects of imagery in social phobia could 
be understood. Within this framework images may function as one form of self-
representation with the potential to influence the working self. It is through this 47 
 
relationship with the working self that these images could exert their effects on 
cognition, emotion and behaviour in social phobia. The theoretical propositions 
outlined indicate the need to further evaluate the potentially triadic relationship 
between imagery, self and autobiographical memory and a number of avenues for 
future research have been discussed. It is hoped that this paper will provide a 
springboard for future research, and that it may act as a catalyst for further thinking 
with regards to the mechanisms that could underpin the effects of imagery in social 
phobia.  
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Abstract 
This study utilised an imagery manipulation technique to examine how the 
valence of self-imagery affects different aspects of the self. Eighty-eight participants 
pre-screened for high (n=44) and low (n=44) levels of social anxiety held either a 
positive or a negative self-image in mind. Participants completed measures of 
implicit and explicit self-esteem, and self-concept clarity. Results indicated that both 
high and low socially anxious participants, holding in mind a negative self-image, 
reported lower levels of positive explicit self-esteem, a weaker positive implicit self-
esteem bias, and higher levels of negative explicit self-esteem, than those holding in 
mind a positive self-image. Negative images were only associated with reduced self-
concept clarity in low socially anxious participants. Participants then took part in a 
social threat activation task, ‘Cyberball’, during which they were excluded by two of 
the three other players in a virtual ball toss game. Results indicated that during this 
experience of social threat, the increase in self-esteem associated with positive self-
imagery in the first part of the study was still evident across participant groups. 
Overall, the findings support the validity of interventions that aim to modify negative 
images of the self and promote more positive images in social phobia. The results 
suggest a potential relationship between self-imagery and some specific, self-
evaluative components of the self-concept. The potential contribution of this 
relationship to the persistence of social phobia is discussed.  
 
Keywords: Social anxiety; Social phobia; Imagery; Self-esteem; Self-concept clarity; 
Social exclusion. 59 
 
Introduction 
Social phobia is characterised by the experience of a negative sense of self 
that is represented by the negative automatic thoughts frequently reported by patients 
(e.g., Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Stopa & Clark, 1993). This negative 
self-view is also encapsulated for many by the content of the negative and distorted 
self-images commonly experienced in social phobia (e.g., Hackmann, Clark, & 
McManus, 2000; Hirsch, Clark, & Yiend, 2004). These negative images of self are, 
at least in part, linked to autobiographical memories of early aversive or traumatic 
experiences such as bullying (Hackmann et al., 2000). According to Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000), self and autobiographical memory are inextricably linked 
within a Self-Memory System (SMS). This system stores many different types of 
information about the self (e.g., knowledge about life time periods, memories about 
general events and memories of specific autobiographical events), and provides the 
knowledge base from which self-representations are constructed (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004).  
The negative self-images experienced in social phobia could form part of the 
SMS in which the working self (i.e., the current active self-concept; see Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) that is retrieved in response to social threat is characterised by 
low self-esteem, uncertainty about self, and fear of negative evaluation by others. 
This suggestion is consistent with Brewin’s (2006) retrieval competition hypothesis 
in which he argues that multiple representations of self compete for retrieval. 
Frequent and elaborate rehearsal of a memory representation during which it is 
deeply semantically processed increases its accessibility (Baddeley, 1990). For 
individuals with social phobia, the repeated retrieval and enhanced processing caused 60 
 
by increased self-focused attention on negative self-images is likely to increase 
accessibility, making them more likely to win the retrieval competition. This 
repeated activation may also increase the accessibility of other congruent self-
representations, and may reduce the accessibility of more positive competing self-
representations. The latter proposition could be explained by the phenomenon of 
Retrieval Induced Forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994), which demonstrates 
that the recall of particular information from long-term memory can impair the 
retention and recall of related competing memory representations. The end result of 
all of these processes would be to ultimately reinforce the individual’s negative sense 
of self. If this is the case, then manipulating the content of the self-imagery 
experienced by individuals with high levels of social anxiety could influence the 
construction of the working self-concept; for example, negative self-images could 
activate a more negative and dysfunctional working self-concept than positive 
images. 
The overall aim of this paper is to examine how the valence of self-imagery 
affects different aspects of the self. In the first part of the study, we examine the 
effects of manipulating positive and negative self-imagery on two aspects of the self-
concept, namely self-esteem and self-concept clarity. These concepts will be 
described in more detail below. In the second part of the study, we investigate 
whether positive and negative images affect the experience of self during a social 
threat activation task.  
Social anxiety and the self 
What defines self is a complex issue and our experience of self is the end 
result of multiple processes not all of which are accessible through conscious 61 
 
reflection (Stopa, 2009). This study utilises self-esteem as a measure of self, because 
it provides the opportunity to measure an active evaluative attitude towards self 
(Demo, Savin-Williams, Lipka, & Brinthaupt, 1992; Rosenberg, 1965) at both an 
explicit and implicit (automatic, non-conscious) level. Low levels of explicit self-
esteem (e.g., Bouvard et al., 1999; Westenberg, 1998) and a weaker positive implicit 
self-esteem bias (de Jong, 2002; Tanner, Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006) are reported to 
be components of the negative working self-concept which characterises social 
phobia.  Not all of the processes contributing to self-esteem operate on a conscious 
level (i.e., schema level processes; Segal & Swallow, 1994). Therefore, measurement 
of this aspect of self-concept is essential at both the explicit and implicit level.  
Discrepancies between levels of implicit and explicit self-esteem (e.g., 
Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-
Browne, & Correll, 2003) have recently led to the suggestion that they may represent 
different constructs with different processes underpinning their development (Hetts 
& Pelham, 2001). Hetts and Pelham (2001) suggest that if, as is proposed, implicit 
self-esteem is formed primarily through the non-conscious automatic processing 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) and acceptance of evaluative feedback, then, unlike 
explicit self-esteem, it may be relatively insensitive to conscious correction. In this 
way, implicit self-esteem could be proposed to reflect accumulated social 
evaluations, whereas explicit self-esteem may reflect conscious interpretation (or 
even re-interpretation) of these experiences (Zeigler-Hill, 2006). If this is true, then 
conscious cognitive processes such as post-event processing, which contribute to the 
negative sense of self in social phobia (e.g., Mellings & Alden, 2000), are likely to 
influence explicit self-esteem to a greater degree than implicit self-esteem; 62 
 
potentially resulting in a more negative explicit compared to implicit, self-view. It is 
essential to measure attitudes to self at both the conscious and non-conscious level in 
order to capture any differences in how each may be contributing to the individual’s 
experience of self.  
Self-concept clarity (Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993) is used as 
a second measure of self. Self-concept clarity is defined as “the extent to which the 
content of an individual’s self-concept (e.g., perceived personal attributes) are 
clearly and consistently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable” 
(Campbell et al., 1996, p. 141). The use of self-concept clarity, in addition to self-
esteem, allows us to capture not only the content of self, but also the degree of 
confidence with which one believes this content to be representative. Low levels of 
clarity are proposed as an important factor maintaining social anxiety. Wilson and 
Rapee (2006) suggest that uncertainty of self-concept, particularly in relation to 
negative self-evaluative attributes, might result in individuals with social phobia 
giving undue weight to other people’s opinions, or at least to their perception of other 
people’s opinions, which is often negative and distorted. The need to seek feedback 
to address uncertainty of self-concept fits with research highlighting intolerance of 
uncertainty as a factor contributing to the severity of social anxiety (Boelen & 
Reijntjes, 2009).  
Low levels of clarity are associated with high levels of social anxiety 
(Moscovitch, Orr, Rowa, Reimer, & Antony, 2009; Stopa, Brown, Luke, & Hirsch, 
in prep; Wilson & Rapee, 2006) and as such may represent a component of the 
socially phobic individual’s negative working self-concept. Wilson and Rapee (2006) 
found that after controlling for other forms of psychopathology, socially phobic 63 
 
participants showed increased uncertainty in the self-descriptiveness of negative 
attributes compared to non-patient controls. Additionally, in a more recent study 
involving a non-clinical population, lower levels of self-concept clarity were 
associated with higher levels of social anxiety (Stopa et al., in prep). In this study, 
self-concept clarity was a unique predictor of social anxiety. 
Social anxiety, the self and social threat 
Within the second part of the study, the effects of image valence on 
participants’ experience of self during a social threat-activation task are explored. 
Negative self-images held in mind during social threat activation (e.g., giving a 
speech or holding a conversation with a stranger) are associated with increased 
perception of bodily sensations, increased anxiety and poorer performance ratings 
both by self and an observer (e.g., Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison, 
2003); increased self-accuracy compared to positive self-images (Vassilopoulos, 
2005); and increased self-reported use of safety behaviours (Hirsch, Meynen, & 
Clark, 2004). These negative self-images also led to faster retrieval of negative 
autobiographical memories in comparison to positive self-images (Stopa & Jenkins, 
2007). One criticism of the threat-activation tasks used within these studies is the 
potential for individual differences in the social experience to confound results. For 
example, although the verbal responses of stooges holding a conversation or listening 
to a speech can be scripted, it is not always possible to keep non-verbal responses 
consistent. In answer to this criticism, one experimental manipulation of social threat 
that standardises the experience of social threat is the Cyberball task, designed by 
Williams, Cheung, and Choi (2000).  This task evokes social threat through the 
exclusion of participants from a virtual ball-toss game. Participants believe that they 64 
 
are playing online against three other players, but in fact the game is controlled by a 
computer programme that can be modified to manipulate various degrees of 
exclusion. The current study used a partial exclusion condition (described in detail 
within the method section) because total exclusion was considered too aversive. 
Research has, as yet, failed to identify any variables that moderate the immediate 
effects of total exclusion (e.g., Oaten, Williams, Jones, & Zadro, 2008; Williams et 
al., 2000; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). Given that a fear of negative 
evaluation by others is a factor maintaining social phobia, and that highly socially 
anxious individuals demonstrate a tendency to interpret even socially ambiguous 
situations in a negative way (e.g., Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000), 
we considered that a partial social exclusion task would be effective in activating 
social threat in a socially anxious population.  
To date, the effect of exclusion has been generally measured in terms of its 
impact on positive affect and on four ‘fundamental need scores’, which can be 
conceptualised as representing aspects of the experience of self. These are self-
esteem, control, belonging and meaningful existence (see Williams, 2001, for a 
review of these need scores). Williams proposes that these needs are critical for 
human motivation, efficacy and survival, and that social exclusion threatens them, 
thereby producing psychological discomfort. During the experience of exclusion, 
individuals are denied all signs of being connected to others, which reduces their 
sense of belonging. There is the implicit accusation of the excluded individual having 
done something wrong, which reduces self-esteem, and control is lost when the 
individual is unable to elicit any reaction from others. Thus, the existence of the 
individual is ultimately denied by his or her circumstances (Williams & Zadro, 65 
 
2001). Evidence demonstrating the detrimental impact of just five minutes of 
Cyberball total exclusion
4 on these needs has begun to emerge over the last few years 
(e.g., Zadro, Boland, & Richardson, 2006; Zadro et al., 2004). In line with previous 
research, this study measured the effects of exclusion on these fundamental need 
scores.  
The effect of exclusion on self-esteem is of primary interest in this study. 
Social threat is proposed to activate a negative view of the self in social phobia 
(Clark & Wells, 1995). Clark and Wells propose that individuals with social phobia 
have unstable self-schema, only seeing themselves negatively when a negative self-
view is activated by anticipating, experiencing, or ruminating on, social interactions. 
Therefore, an important question to consider is whether any observed effects of 
positive imagery on self-esteem, which may be found in the first part of the study, 
could be maintained in the face of social threat activation, or whether a social threat 
may activate a dysfunctional and maladaptive working self, which overrides any 
effects of the positive imagery. Spontaneous images of the self are used by the 
individual with social phobia to judge their performance and infer how they appear to 
others (Clark & Wells, 1995). If this is true, then we would expect the valence of the 
available self-image to influence participants’ perceptions of their experience, and to 
differentially influence positive affect, self-esteem, feelings of belonging, control and 
meaningful existence immediately following the social threat activation task.  
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Hypotheses 
This study builds on the current literature regarding the role of negative self-
imagery in the maintenance of social phobia. It was hypothesised that participants in 
the negative self-imagery condition would demonstrate a more negative working 
self-concept, as demonstrated by less positive implicit self-esteem, higher explicit 
negative and lower explicit positive self-esteem, and less self-concept clarity, than 
those in the positive self-imagery condition. Participants in the negative imagery 
condition were also expected to report lower feelings of self-esteem, belonging, 
control and meaningful existence and less positive affect, following a social 
exclusion task (Cyberball). As well as the main effect of image valence, we also 
predicted a main effect of group, such that high socially anxious participants would 
demonstrate a more negative working self-concept, and that following a social 
exclusion task (Cyberball), they would demonstrate lower feelings of self-esteem, 
belonging, control and meaningful existence and less positive affect.  
 Method 
Participants and Design  
Eighty-eight participants (28 males and 60 females) aged 18-55 (78.40% aged 
18-21) were recruited from a university (n=82) and local community (n=6) 
population. Participants were assigned to a positive or negative self-imagery 
condition in a 2(Social Anxiety: High Social Anxiety, Low Social Anxiety) X 
2(Image Valence: Positive Self-image, Negative Self-image) between-subjects 
design. Participants were screened for a number of studies using the Social 67 
 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998)
5. Forty-four high socially 
anxious participants, who scored 29 or above (M=41.14, SD=8.71) and 44 low 
socially anxious participants who scored nine or below (M=6.18, SD=2.43) took part 
in this study.  The two groups did not differ significantly in terms of mean age, t(86) 
= -.326, p = .745, or gender ratio, χ2= (1) = 3.352, df = 1, p = .067. The levels of 
social anxiety reported by the high socially anxious group indicates a clinical level of 
social phobia in our non-clinical sample (mean average for a clinical population of 
socially phobic individuals, M=34.6, SD=16.4; Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  
Imagery Manipulation 
An image script developed by Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, and Williams (2003) 
was used to assist each participant in the construction of a positive or negative self-
image (see Appendix C). Once an image was brought to mind, participants closed 
their eyes and were asked to describe, in detail, the type of image they had; what it 
looked like and how it might be viewed by other people. At the end of the script, 
participants rated the vividness of the image on a scale of 0 (not at all vivid) to 100 
(extremely vivid). Where the vividness of the self-image was rated as less than 60, 
the script was repeated once in order to gather additional details and reinforce the 
image generated. The data from participants who continued to rate the vividness of 
the image as less than 60 (n=1) were excluded from analysis.  Participants were 
instructed to keep the image in mind as they completed the various experimental 
tasks. They were given a reminder to do so, following the Implicit Association Task 
and prior to the Cyberball task. At the end of the experimental session, a 
                                                           
5 It was anticipated that most of the participants would be university students therefore inclusion cut-
off’s on the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale were based on one standard deviation above or below 
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manipulation check recorded the extent to which participants kept the image in mind 
on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 100 (all the time). Participants unable to keep the image 
in mind for at least 50% of the time were excluded from analysis (n=3).  
Questionnaire Measures  
Social Anxiety. The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998) is a 19-item self-report designed to assess fear of social interaction. 
Items are rated on a five-point scale from 0 (not at all characteristic of me) to 4 
(extremely characteristic or true of me). The SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) has 
high internal consistency (α = .94) and good test-retest reliability (r = .92 over both 4 
and 12 weeks) and discriminates well between individuals with and without social 
phobia (E. J. Brown et al., 1997; Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997). 
Participants completed the SIAS at screening and at the beginning of the 
experimental session. Participants who did not fall within the defined cut-offs at 
testing were excluded (n=3). The SIAS demonstrated strong internal consistency in 
the current sample (α = .97). 
Explicit Self-Esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 
1965) is a 10-item self-report measure of explicit self-esteem. Items are rated on a 4-
point Likert scale. Higher total RSE scores reflect higher self-esteem when items 3, 
5, 8, 9 and 10 are reverse scored. The RSE demonstrates good internal reliability (α 
= .92) and a two-week test-retest reliability coefficient of .88 (Corcoran & Fischer, 
1987). The RSE is commonly used in clinical practice (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991) 
and is a well-validated measure of self-esteem (Winters, Myers, & Proud, 2002). The 
RSE demonstrated high internal consistency in the current sample (α = .93). 69 
 
Anxiety. The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) is a 40-item Likert scale that measures 
separate dimensions of State (STAI-S; items 1-20) and Trait (STAI-T; items 21-40) 
anxiety. The STAI is commonly used in research and clinical settings. The internal 
consistency of this measure within a student sample exceeds .90 (Spielberger et al., 
1983). Participants completed the STAI-T before the imagery manipulation.  
Participants also completed the STAI-S to assess anxiety levels following the 
imagery manipulation. The internal consistency of the STAI-S and STAI-T was high 
within the current sample (αs > .93). 
Depression. The Depression and Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (DASS21; Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-item self-report scale consisting of three subscales 
measuring depression, anxiety, and general distress. The DASS21 has good 
psychometric properties (e.g., Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; T. A. 
Brown et al., 1997; P. F. Lovibond, 1998). This questionnaire was used to assess 
participants’ level of depressive symptoms and therefore only the depression 
subscale, DASS-D, will be reported. High levels of social anxiety are often 
associated with elevated levels of depression (e.g., Fava et al., 2000). The depression 
subscale had moderate internal consistency within the current sample (α = .87). 
Although it was expected that high socially anxious participants would 
demonstrate higher scores on the STAI-T, DASS-D and lower scores on the RSE, 
these were included to ensure that there were no differences between the two 
imagery conditions within each social anxiety group.   
State Self-Esteem. The State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES; McFarland & Ross, 
1982) is a 12-item measure of explicit state self-esteem. The SSES incorporates the 70 
 
12 items that loaded onto one self-esteem factor in McFarland & Ross’ (1982) factor 
analysis: proud, competent, confident, smart, resourceful, effective, efficient, 
inadequate, incompetent, stupid, worthless and shameful. Participants use a Likert 
scale to indicate how much each item represents their current feelings about 
themselves. Two subscales can be calculated by summing positively and negatively 
worded items separately, which McFarland and Ross identify as elements of positive 
and negative self-esteem. The items developed by Ross and McFarland (1982) 
successfully measure changes attributable to self-esteem (Baumgardner, Kaufman, & 
Levy, 1989). The SSES was used to measure positive and negative state self-esteem 
following the imagery manipulation. The positive and negative subscales 
demonstrated high internal consistency within the current sample (α = .95 and α = 
.94 respectively).   
Self-Concept Clarity. The Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS; Campbell et al., 
1996) is a 12-item measure of the temporal stability, consistency, and clarity of self-
beliefs. The SCCS has a test-retest reliability of between .70 and .79 and the internal 
consistency of the measure in a university sample is above .85 (Campbell et al., 
1996). Additionally, the SCCS predicts unique variance in the stability and 
consistency of self-descriptors which indicates good validity (Campbell et al., 1996). 
The SCCS was used to assess the extent to which self-beliefs are clearly and 
confidently defined following the imagery manipulation. The internal consistency of 
the measure in the current sample was good (α = .90). 
Self-Esteem, Feelings of Belonging, Control, Meaningful Existence, and 
Positive Affect. Feelings of belonging, self-esteem, control and a sense of meaningful 
existence are associated with general psychological well-being (see Baumeister & 71 
 
Leary, 1995; Williams et al., 2000). The Cyberball questionnaire (Zadro et al., 2004; 
see Appendix D) is a self-report scale designed to measure these fundamental needs. 
It consists of 12 items (three questions for each need subscale) assessing the effects 
of ostracism on belonging (e.g., “I felt like an outsider”), self-esteem (e.g., “I felt 
good about myself”), control (e.g., “I felt like I had control over the course of the 
interaction”) and meaningful existence (e.g., “I felt nonexistent”). Items are 
answered on a 9-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients have suggested reasonable internal consistency for each subscale 
(belonging=.74; control=.72; self-esteem=.70; and meaningful existence=.66) (Zadro 
et al., 2004). Within the current sample, the internal consistency of the four scores 
was poorer than in previous research, with the exception of the self-esteem subscale 
(self-esteem=.82; control=.67 belonging=.53; and meaningful existence=.48). The 
questionnaire also contains two manipulation checks for inclusion/ostracism (e.g., 
“What percent of throws were thrown to you?” and “To what extent were you 
accepted by the other participants?”). Mood is assessed by four 9-point bipolar 
scales (good-bad, happy-sad, relaxed-tense, not aroused-aroused). A total mean 
score is calculated as a mean average of these four ratings, with a lower score 
indicating less positive affect. The questionnaire also contains two 9-point scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so) assessing feelings of enjoyment and 
anger whilst playing the game. This questionnaire has been used in a number of 
published studies investigating the effects of ostracism using the Cyberball game 
(e.g., Krill, Platek, & Wathne, 2008; Zadro et al., 2006; Zadro et al., 2004).  72 
 
Experimental Tasks  
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The 
IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) is a computerised reaction time task designed to test the 
relative strength of association between two concept categories. Categories in this 
experiment were self and other, and positive and negative. Table 1 shows the words 
used in each category; the positive and negative words were taken from a previous 
study assessing implicit views of the self in socially anxious individuals (Tanner et 
al., 2006). Although it measures associations rather than beliefs, it is argued that as 
associations are likely to be part of beliefs, the IAT offers an indirect index of the 
existence of dysfunctional evaluative beliefs free from many of the demand 
characteristics limiting self-report measures (De Houwer, 2002). 
Table 1.  
Word used within the Implicit Association Task to represent each concept category 
Self  Other  Positive  Negative 
I  Them  Secure  Boring 
Me  They  Likeable  Stupid 
Mine  His  Clever  Worthless 
First name of 
participant 
Hers  Interesting 
Confident 
Accepted 
Loveable 
Worthy 
Incompetent 
Disliked 
Ridiculous 
Inferior 
Useless 
 
The underlying assumption of this experiential paradigm is that congruent 
stimuli are responded to more quickly than incongruent stimuli. The relative 73 
 
congruence and incongruence between categories are inferred from reaction time 
comparisons. Within the self-esteem version of this task , stronger associations 
between self + positive words (relative to self + negative words) are indicated by 
more positive IAT-D effect scores (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Stronger 
associations are proposed to reflect more positive implicit self-esteem (Greenwald et 
al., 1998; Greenwald et al., 2003). As a measure of associations, the IAT (assessing 
implicit view of self) has reasonable test-retest reliability and internal validity 
ranging from 0.52 (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) to 0.69 (Bosson, Swann, & 
Pennebaker, 2000). During the IAT participants were asked to respond as fast as 
possible by pressing one of two buttons on a response box when a word appeared in 
a fixed position on the screen. The IAT used within this study consisted of seven 
stages which are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. 
Implicit Association Task Procedure  
Block  Function  Item assigned to left key 
response 
Item assigned to right 
key response  
1: 16 trials  Practice  Self words  Other words 
2: 16 trials   Practice  Negative words  Positive words  
3: 16 trials   Practice  Self words + Negative 
words 
Other words + Positive 
words 
4: 40 trials
    Test  Self words + Negative 
words 
Other words + Positive 
words 
5: 16 trials   Practice  Other words  Self words 
6: 16 trials   Practice  Other words + Negative 
words 
Self words + Positive 
words 
7: 40 trials
    Test   Other words + Negative 
words 
Self words + Positive 
words 74 
 
The presentation of the congruent block first (self + positive and other + 
negative) can produce a larger IAT-D effect score (Farnham, Greenwald, Banaji, 
Abrams, & Hogg, 1999). The presentation of blocks three and four, and six and 
seven, was therefore counterbalanced within groups of participants to avoid order 
effects. During each phase the words were presented in a random order. The same 
items were never presented on two or more consecutive trials and the correct 
response was never the same on four or more consecutive trials. The IAT was 
presented on a laptop with a 60Hz refresh rate. Each item was presented in white 
capital letters 7mm high and 5mm wide on a blue background. When a participant 
incorrectly categorised an item, a red X appeared beneath the word until the 
participant entered the correct response. Participants could take a self-terminated 
break after each block of trials. The task lasted approximately 5 minutes. The scoring 
procedure is discussed in the data screening and analysis section.  
Social Threat Activation Task: Cyberball. This task is a computer programme 
that allows the experimenter to create various interactive scenarios using a virtual 
ball-tossing game. In the game, participants engage with three other players whom 
they believe are real, and are connected through a network. The game begins with 
one of the computerised players throwing the ball to the participants. Participants are 
instructed to throw the ball to one of the other players each time they receive it. In 
this study, the behaviour of the three other players was pre-determined by a computer 
programme. After participants had received the ball twice, they were excluded from 
the game by two of the three other participants (i.e., they never received the ball from 
these two people again). In order to enhance believability, participants were informed 
that they would be playing online with three other people. The experimenter left the 75 
 
room twice to check on the attendance and progress of the ‘other participants’
6. 
Participants were not allowed to begin playing until the experimenter received a 
(staged) phone call to indicate that the ‘others’ were ready to begin. Prior to 
debriefing, participants were asked, “During the game did you believe that you were 
playing against other participants?” Responses were categorised as “yes”, “no” or 
“unsure”. The game lasted for 40 throws (approximately five minutes). The game 
was downloaded with the permission of the developers (Williams et al., 2000) at: 
http://www.psy.mq.edu.au/staff/kip/Announce/Cyber-ball.  
Materials 
The IAT and the Cyberball tasks were administered via a laptop computer 
connected to the university’s internet network. The laptop logged participants’ 
responses to the IAT via a response box connected via a USB port.   
Procedure 
Participants who met the inclusion criteria following screening were invited 
to attend the experimental session and were allocated to either the positive or the 
negative self-imagery condition. After giving their informed consent (Appendices E 
and F), participants completed the RSE, STAI-Trait, DASS-21 and the SIAS. 
Throughout the study, where several questionnaires were administered, the order was 
counterbalanced to avoid order effects. Participants were then guided through the 
self-imagery exercise. Next, the IAT was administered followed by the STAI-State, 
SCCS and SSES. Participants then played Cyberball and completed the Cyberball 
                                                           
6 Participants were told the research was being undertaken jointly with other researchers who were 
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questionnaire and were debriefed (Appendix G). Given the possible distressing 
impact of the negative imagery manipulation and/or the social threat activation task, 
a 5-minute positive imagery exercise was offered.  
Ethics 
The study was awarded ethical approval by the University of Southampton’s 
School of Psychology Ethics Committee (Appendices H and I).   
Results 
Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS version 16.0.  An a priori 
power calculation, based on data from Tanner et al. (2006), indicated that in order to 
achieve a power level (1-β) of 0.95, a sample size of 80 would be required. In total 
data from 95 participants were collected. However, seven participants were excluded 
from the analysis; at testing two participants fell outside the threshold on the SIAS 
and five were unable to generate or hold in mind the image required within the 
study
7. Data from 44 high socially anxious (HSA) and 44 low socially anxious (LSA) 
participants were included in the final analysis. A minimum statistical level of .05 
was set for all tests.  
Data Screening and Analysis   
 Data from the HSA and LSA groups were screened for normality of 
distribution and homogeneity of variance. Where data did not meet assumptions, 
either log or square root transformations were undertaken. For all variables with the 
                                                           
7 There were no significant differences on trait measures of self-esteem, depression or anxiety 
between included and excluded participants (lowest p=.107).  
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exception of SIAS, transformations resulted in homogeneity of variance. The 
transformed data was therefore used in analysis
8. Unfortunately, transformation did 
not result in normal distributions for age, DASS-D, RSE, negative state self-esteem, 
and the control and self-esteem subscales of the Cyberball questionnaire
9. Awareness 
of this will be important when interpreting data analysis, although analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) are reported to be robust even when assumptions are violated; 
this is especially true for violation of the normality assumption described above 
(Howell, 2004).  
The effects of, and interactions between, imagery valence and social anxiety 
were explored using a series of two-way independent ANOVAs or ANCOVAs 
(where analysis of the impact of covariates was necessary). As depression may 
influence responding on self-esteem and self-concept clarity measures, and levels of 
depression are often high in people with high levels of social anxiety (e.g., Fava et 
al., 2000), depression was entered as a covariate in analysis of these variables.  IAT 
data was scored using Greenwald et al’s (2003) improved algorithm. The improved 
algorithm was developed following a systematic evaluation of a number of statistical 
options for managing problems that occur in using latency measures, e.g., spurious 
responses that appear as extreme outliers (see Greenwald et al., 2003). The algorithm 
was developed to minimise the impact of such problems, and as such generates data 
that better reflects underlying association strength. It also provides increased power 
to detect statistically significant differences in comparison to the conventional 
                                                           
8 Mean scores and standard deviations reported in Tables and Figures represent untransformed scores.  
9 Although Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were significant for these variables (p>.05). Skew and kurtosis 
z scores indicated the distribution of the data did not differ significantly from a normal distribution 
(Howell, 2004) for all variables with the exception of negative state self-esteem.  78 
 
algorithm. It is therefore suggested that the new algorithm is valid with smaller 
sample sizes (Greenwald et al., 2003). Data from blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7 were used. 
Trials with response latencies over 10 000ms were excluded. Participants who 
responded more quickly than 300ms on over 10% of trials should have been 
excluded; however, no participants met this exclusion criterion. The mean correct 
latency was calculated for each block and incorrect latencies were replaced by the 
mean block latency. The means of each block were calculated and the difference 
obtained from the practice-incongruent block minus the practice-congruent block, 
and the test-incongruent block minus the test-congruent block. The resulting scores 
were divided by the pooled standard deviations to calculate the IAT-D effect. 
Finally, a two-way independent ANCOVA was used to explore the effects of 
imagery and social anxiety on the IAT-D effect scores.  
Participant Characteristics 
Table 3 shows the age and gender composition of the positive and negative 
self-imagery conditions within the HSA and LSA groups, as well as the means and 
standard deviations for scores on the SIAS, RSE, STAI-T, and the DASS-D.  Chi-
squared analysis indicated no significant differences in the gender composition of 
participants between, χ2= 3.35, df = 1, p=.067, or within, HSA: χ2= 0.38, df = 1, 
p=.540; LSA: χ2= 0.00, df = 1, p=1.00, groups. There was no main effect of social 
anxiety or image valence on age, and no interactions were noted (lowest p=.287).  
There were main effects of social anxiety for SIAS, F(1,84)=648.95, p<.001; 
RSE, F(1,84)=85.79, p<.001; STAI-T, F(1,84)=124.35, p<.001; and DASS-D, 
F(1,84)=28.70, p<.001. As expected, the HSA group reported higher levels of social 79 
 
anxiety, trait anxiety and depression, and lower levels of explicit self-esteem, 
compared to the LSA group. However, there were no main effects of imagery and no 
interactions between imagery and social anxiety (p values ranged from .12 to .91), 
which indicates that within each social anxiety group there were no differences 
between the two imagery conditions prior to the imagery manipulation. 
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Table 3.  
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Scores on the SIAS, RSE, 
STAI-T, DASS-D, and Age and Gender composition of participant groups 
  High Socially Anxious    Low Socially Anxious 
  Negative Image 
(n=22) 
Positive Image 
(n=22) 
  Negative Image 
(n=22) 
Positive Image 
(n=22) 
SIAS   42.05 (5.99)  40.23 (7.85)    6.18 (2.32)  6.18 (2.59) 
RSE  1.51 (0.50)  1.70 (0.45)    2.47 (0.40)  2.48 (0.40) 
STAI-T  52.41 (8.10)  49.95 (10.01)    34.05 (6.69)  31.64 (5.34) 
DASS-D  6.45 (4.58)  5.50 (4.57)    1.91 (2.45)  2.00 (1.49) 
Age  21.64 (5.99)  22. 64 (7.85)    20.68 (3.75)  22.68 (7.80) 
Gender  N (%)    N (%) 
  Male  8 (36.4%)  10 (45.5%)    5 (23.0%)  5 (23.0%) 
  Female  14 (64.6%)  12 (54.5%)    17 (77.0%)  17 (77.0%) 
 
Imagery Manipulation Check   
There were no significant main effects of social anxiety or image valence and 
no interactions for the vividness of the self-image generated during the experimental 
task (p values ranged from .13 to .81). The overall mean vividness rating for self-
images generated was 80.30% (SD=11.84). There were no main effects of social 
anxiety or image valence and no interactions for the percentage of time that 81 
 
participants held the image in mind during the task (p values ranged from .07 to .93). 
The mean percentage of time participants held the self-images in mind was 70.40% 
(SD=10.73).  
There was a main effect of social anxiety, F(1,84) =25.95, p<.001, and a 
main effect of image valence, F(1,84) =51.59, p<.001 on state anxiety following the 
imagery manipulation. These effects were not mediated by an interaction, F(1,84) = 
0.20, p=.655. Participants in the HSA group reported significantly higher levels of 
state anxiety (M=42.77, SD=11.04) than participants in the LSA group (M=34.23, 
SD=10.89).  Additionally,  participants  who  held  in  mind  a  negative  self-image 
reported significantly higher levels of anxiety (M=44.95, SD=11.48)  compared to 
participants who held in mind a positive self-image (M=32.05, SD=7.79).    
Self-Concept Measures  
Following the imagery manipulation, implicit and explicit self-measures were 
administered to explore the effect of image valence and social anxiety on different 
aspects of self-concept.  
Implicit Self-Esteem. Initially, a paired samples t-test was conducted to assess 
whether the underlying assumption of the IAT paradigm, i.e., that congruent stimuli 
are  responded  to  faster  than  incongruent  stimuli,  was  met.  In  line  with  this 
assumption  there  was  a  significant  difference  in  response  times  to  congruent 
(M=891.78, SD=257.06) compared to incongruent (M=1179.79, SD=306.69) word 
pairings,  t(87)=  9.575,  p=<.001,  with  participants  responding  more  quickly  to 
congruent word presentations. The improved algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) was 82 
 
then used to score the IAT. Table 4 shows the IAT-D effect for the HSA and LSA 
group.   
Both groups exhibited a positive implicit self-esteem bias as demonstrated by 
positive  IAT-D  effect  scores.  In  order  to  investigate  whether  there  were  any 
differences  in  implicit  self-esteem  and  whether  depression  contributed  to  these 
differences, IAT-D scores were analysed using a 2(level of social anxiety) x 2(image 
valence) ANCOVA with depression scores as a covariate. There was no main effect 
of social anxiety, F(1,83) = .162, p=.688, partial η
2=.002, or of depression, F(1,83) = 
.964, p=329, partial η
2=.011, on IAT-D effect scores. However, there was a main 
effect of image valence, F(1,83)= 9.267, p=.003, partial η
2=.09, with participants in 
the  negative  self-imagery  condition  exhibiting  less  positive  implicit  self-esteem 
(M=0.60,  SD=0.82)  than  those  in  the  positive  self-imagery  condition  (M=1.09, 
SD=0.70).  There  was  no  interaction  between  imagery  and  social  anxiety,  F(1, 
84)=1.16, p=.280, partial η
2=.012.  
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Table 4. 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations (in Parenthesis) of Self-Concept Measures   
  High Socially Anxious    Low Socially Anxious 
  Negative 
Image 
(n=22) 
Positive 
Image 
(n=22) 
  Negative 
Image 
(n=22) 
Positive 
Image 
(n=22) 
IAT-D effect  0.42    
(0.74) 
1.10 
(0.86) 
  0.77 
(0.88) 
1.09   
(0.52) 
Explicit positive self-esteem  32.73 
(13.09) 
52.77 
(12.25) 
  46.77 
(10.73) 
60.41 
(9.74) 
Explicit negative self-esteem  28.14 
(13.37) 
12.09 
(6.19) 
  15.32  
(7.89) 
7.82  
(3.26) 
Self-concept clarity  32.18  
(5.25) 
33.36 
(9.39) 
  40.05  
(8.34) 
47.73 
(7.81) 
 
Explicit Self-Esteem and Self-Concept Clarity. Table 4 shows the means and 
standard deviations for the explicit self-concept measures. There were main effects 
of social anxiety on positive, F(1,83) = 10.83, p=.001, partial η
2=.115, and negative 
state self-esteem, F(1,83) = 14.22, p<.001, partial η
2=.146. There were also main 
effects of imagery on positive, F(1,83) = 45.93, p<.001, partial η
2=.356, and negative 
state self-esteem, F(1,83)=47.69, p<.001, partial η
2=.365. Participants in the HSA 
group reported lower positive self-esteem and higher negative self-esteem than LSA 84 
 
participants. Additionally, participants holding in mind a negative self-image 
reported lower positive self-esteem and higher negative self-esteem than those 
holding in mind a positive self-image. There was no main effect of depression 
(lowest p=.301) and no interactions between image valence and social anxiety for 
either variable (lowest p=.22).  
There were significant main effects of depression, F(1,83) = 15.10, 
p<.001, partial η
2=.154, social anxiety, F(1,83) = 18.08, p<.001, partial η
2=.179, and 
image valence, F(1,83) = 6.84, p=.011, partial η
2=.076, on self-concept clarity. There 
was also a significant interaction (illustrated in Figure 1) between social anxiety and 
image valence on self-concept clarity, F(1,83) = 5.69, p=.019, partial η
2=.064. Post 
hoc analysis indicated that participants in the LSA group holding a negative self-
image in mind reported significantly lower clarity than those holding in mind a 
positive self-image, t(42)= -3.15, p=.003. However, there was no significant 
difference for those in the HSA group holding in mind a positive versus a negative 
self-image, t(32.97)= -0.52, p=.61.  
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Figure 1. Mean self-concept clarity (+SE) for low socially anxious (n=44)              
and high socially anxious (n=44) groups in negative and positive self-imagery 
conditions. 
 
Social Threat Task: Cyberball 
Table 5 displays means and standard deviations for the Cyberball 
questionnaire which assessed participants’ experiences of a period of social 
exclusion and self-reported feelings of self-esteem, belonging, control and 
meaningful existence following this experience. The effects of social anxiety and 
image valence on participants’ sense of belonging and meaningful existence cannot 
be reliably reported due to the poor internal consistency obtained within this study 
for the subscales used to measures these variables.  
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Table 5. 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Psychological Needs 
Cyberball Questionnaire Measure (scores range between 1 (not at all) to 9 (very 
much so); Some Items are Reversed Scored) 
  High Socially Anxious 
 
  Low Socially Anxious 
  Negative 
Image  
(n=22) 
Positive 
Image 
(n=22) 
  Negative 
Image 
(n=22) 
Positive 
Image 
(n=22) 
The Cyberball 
experience 
         
Percentage of 
throws received  
18.09 (7.35)  22.55 (9.95)    21.82 (9.33)  24.95 (10.15) 
I felt accepted by the 
other participants  
4.00 (1.69)  4.64 (1.40)    5.23 (2.14)  4.45 (1.68) 
           
I enjoyed playing 
the Cyberball game 
4.23 (1.93)  4.86 (1.98)    5.77 (2.25)  5.27 (1.52) 
I felt angry during 
the Cyberball game  
3.82 (2.22)  3.14 (1.98)    3.18 (2.13)  2.27 (1.72) 
           
Fundamental needs           
Self-esteem  4.32 (1.32)  5.61 (1.58)    5.91 (2.00)  6.70 (1.47) 
Control  3.90 (1.51)  4.27 (1.49)    4.33 (2.11)  4.71 (1.45) 
Belonging  -  -    -  - 
Meaningful 
existence  
-  -    -  - 
           
Positive affect  5.25 (0.87)  5.50 (0.95)    5.23 (1.20)  5.58 (0.84) 
Note. Dashes indicate the means and standard deviations were not reported due to the poor internal 
reliability of the subscale within the current sample.  
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Experience of Exclusion. Both HSA (M=20.32%, SD=8.93) and LSA 
(M=23.39%, SD=9.76) participants overestimated their degree of involvement in the 
game with estimate involvement close to equal participation (actual percentage of the 
throws received was nine percent). Despite this, participants did not report feeling 
completely accepted by other participants: HSA participants rated feelings of 
acceptance on a scale of 1 (not at all accepted) to 9 (very much accepted) as 4.32 
(SD=1.57) and LSA participated rated feeling of acceptance as 4.84 (SD=1.94). 
There were no significant main effects, or interactions, of social anxiety or image 
valence on the perceived percentage of throws received during the game or on the 
degree to which participants felt included in the game (p values ranged from .058 to 
.855).  
There was a significant main effect of social anxiety on the degree to which 
participants enjoyed playing the game, F(1,84)=5.61, p=.02, partial η
2= .063, with 
participants in the LSA group reporting more enjoyment than those in the HSA 
group. There was no main effect of imagery, F(1,84)=0.03, p=.869, partial η
2 < .001, 
and no interactions were noted, F(1,84)=1.90, p=.172, partial η
2=.022. There were 
no main effects of imagery or social anxiety and no interactions noted for the degree 
to which participants felt angry during the game (p values ranged from .069 to .793).  
Self-Esteem and Control
10. There were significant main effects of
  social 
anxiety, F(1,84) = 12.75, p=0.001, partial η
2=.132, and image valence, F(1,84) = 
                                                           
10 A number of studies (e.g., Krill et al., 2008; Zadro et al., 2004) have found that ostracism using the 
Cyberball task results in a decrease in self-esteem, control, belonging and meaningful existence, 
irrespective of whether participants believe they are playing against real players. In order to explore 
this, the analysis was repeated including only those who believed (n=68). This analysis yielded an 
identical pattern of results. Therefore both believers and non-believers were included in the analysis 
reported in the main paper.  88 
 
10.08, p<.002, partial η
2=.107, on self-esteem immediately following exclusion. 
There was no interaction between social anxiety and imagery, F(1,84)=0.56, p=.456, 
partial η
2=.007. However, as levels of depression can influence self-esteem, the 
analysis was repeated using depression scores as a covariate. The analysis indicated 
that there was a main effect of depression on self-esteem following exclusion, and 
the main effect of social anxiety was no longer statistically significant, F(1,83)=3.72, 
p=.056, partial η
2 = .043
11. There were no significant main effects of depression 
(p=.284), social anxiety (p=.748) or image valence (p=.181) on control, and no 
interactions between social anxiety and image valence (p=.692) following the game.  
Positive Affect. There were no significant main effects of depression, social 
anxiety, or imagery on positive affect immediately following exclusion (lowest 
p=.135), and no interaction between social anxiety and imagery (p=.719).
 
Discussion 
The first aim of this study was to investigate the effects of manipulating 
positive and negative self-imagery on two aspects of the self-concept, namely self-
esteem and self-concept clarity. The results demonstrated that holding a negative 
self-image in mind was associated with significantly less positive implicit self-
esteem, lower levels of explicit positive self-esteem, and higher levels of explicit 
negative self-esteem, in comparison with holding a positive self-image in mind. 
However, negative imagery was only associated with reduced self-concept clarity in 
low socially anxious participants. The second aim of the study was to investigate 
                                                           
11 In order to investigate whether trait levels of self-esteem contributed to the observed effects, the 
analysis was repeated using RSE scores as a covariate. The pattern of results remained the same 
indicating that trait differences in self-esteem were not significantly contributing to results.  
 89 
 
whether positive and negative self-images differentially affected the experience of 
self during a social threat task (Cyberball). The results demonstrated that holding a 
negative self-image in mind was associated with lower levels of self-esteem during 
social threat activation, compared to holding a positive self-image in mind. There 
was no main effect of image valence on feelings of control, and due to the poor 
reliability of the belonging and meaningful existence subscales, analysis of these 
variables could not be reliably reported. The results of this study will be discussed in 
more detail with reference to each specific hypothesis.  
The first hypothesis proposed that there would be a main effect of both image 
valence and social anxiety on self-esteem and self-concept clarity. The main effect of 
image valence on both implicit and explicit self-esteem is in line with the proposition 
that holding a positive or negative self-image is linked to the activation of a 
particular working self.  As proposed, negative self-images were associated more 
with the activation of a working self that was characterised by lower self-esteem, 
than the working self associated with positive self-images. The lack of an interaction 
between social anxiety and imagery suggests that the effects of negative self-imagery 
on self-esteem are present in both high and low socially anxious participants.  
The finding that one experience of imagery manipulation influences levels of 
implicit self-esteem is intriguing. Implicit self-esteem is proposed to result from 
automatic, non-conscious and highly practiced self-evaluations (e.g., Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). If this is true, it suggests that implicit self-esteem should be associated 
with a considerable degree of temporal stability and not be easily amenable to acute 
manipulation. This conceptualisation is somewhat in contrast to the findings within 
the current study which suggest a potentially transient nature to this self construct. It 90 
 
is therefore important to consider the possible mechanisms which may account for 
the influence of imagery on implicit self-esteem. One explanation may lie in the 
potential relationship between imagery and the working self. As previously 
highlighted, the experience of self is the end result of multiple processes not all of 
which are available through conscious awareness (Stopa, 2009). If images of the self 
do function within a SMS where they are able to directly influence the construction 
of the self, then we would hypothesise that these images would have the power to 
influence both conscious and non-conscious self-related processes, and therefore the 
power to influence implicit attitudes to self. However, future research attempting to 
replicate and extend the findings of the current study will be important in order to 
clarify the extent to which implicit attitudes are stable or in fact amenable to change.  
How can these results contribute to our understanding of how imagery exerts 
its effect in social anxiety? Firstly, the results provide indirect support for the causal 
role of negative self-imagery in social anxiety. As higher levels of self-esteem appear 
to differentiate low from high socially anxious individuals (e.g., Bouvard et al., 
1999), and there was no significant difference in the levels of self-esteem reported by 
the low group prior to the imagery manipulation, these findings are consistent with 
the idea that negative self-images may be involved in the development of low self-
esteem. Clark and Wells (1995) propose that negative self-images play a causal role 
in social phobia, by increasing anxiety and maintaining negative beliefs about 
appearance and social performance. Low levels of self-esteem are proposed to be a 
diathesis for the emergence of negative self-evaluative cognitions (de Jong, 2002) 
which are likely to reinforce these negative self-beliefs in social phobia. Therefore 
the relationship between negative self-images and more negative self-esteem found 91 
 
in this study, provides some indirect support for the causal role of these images in 
social phobia (which is consistent with the findings of Hirsch, Clark et al., 2003; 
Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison, 2006).  
Secondly, if, as this study suggests, it is possible to induce a reduction in self-
esteem in low socially anxious participants using only one experience of imagery 
manipulation, then it is important to consider how the repeated activation of negative 
self-images may function to maintain social anxiety. The repeated activation of a 
working self characterised by low self-esteem, in addition to the occurrence of the 
negative image itself, is likely to contribute to and reinforce the individual’s 
unconditional negative beliefs about the self, and feed into his or her inability to cope 
with the perceived danger inherent in social situations (Clark & Wells, 1995).  The 
individual could then become trapped in a vicious cycle in which the negative self-
image and negative working self both represent, and serve as evidence for, the 
validity of the other. Increased self-focused attention (Clark & Wells, 1995) is likely 
to increase the weight given to these internal representations as true representations 
of self, because other forms of information are missed or subjected to biased 
interpretation (e.g., Heinrichs & Hofman, 2001). Additionally, the repeated 
activation of these negative self-representations is likely to strengthen their 
accessibility (see Brewin, 2006). Therefore, in situations when self-representations 
are competing for retrieval (e.g., in social situations when the individual is internally 
focused and attempting to assess aspects of self and performance), these negative 
representations are more likely to be retrieved in comparison to more positive 
representations.  92 
 
The retrieval of negative representations may also impact on the accessibility 
of other components of self. This proposition is in line with the findings of the 
current study in which negative images appeared to facilitate the retrieval of more 
negative self-esteem. It is also possible that the retrieval of these negative images 
may inhibit the retrieval of competing positive self-representations. Initial support for 
this suggestion comes from evidence demonstrating the inhibitory effect of negative 
self-images on the retrieval of positive autobiographical memories in high socially 
anxious participants (Stopa & Jenkins, 2007). This mechanism may prevent access to 
information that may challenge the negative self-view characteristic in social phobia. 
The mechanisms proposed above all provide possible insight into the way in which 
negative self-images exert their effects in social phobia. 
The main effect of social anxiety on explicit self-esteem replicates the results 
of previous research demonstrating self-reported low levels of self-esteem in social 
anxiety (e.g., Bouvard et al., 1999; de Jong, 2002) and suggests an important role for 
negative self-evaluative cognitions in the maintenance of social anxiety (in line with 
the cognitive models; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The 
identification of a positive implicit self-esteem bias in both high and low socially 
anxious participants is in line with previous research (de Jong, 2002; Tanner et al., 
2006); however, the absence of a reduced positive implicit self-esteem bias in high 
compared to low socially anxious participants is inconsistent. One explanation for 
this inconsistency is that the reduced implicit self-esteem bias observed in the 
previous studies (de Jong, 2002; Tanner et al., 2006) was eliminated in the current 
study by the imagery manipulation. If holding a positive self-image in mind led to an 
increase in implicit self-esteem in the high socially anxious group, and holding a 93 
 
negative self-image in mind led to a reduction in implicit self-esteem in the low 
socially anxious group, then this might have eliminated any differences between the 
two groups. However, the absence of a main effect of social anxiety on implicit self-
esteem is consistent with the absence of a difference found between clinical and non-
clinical groups in some other areas of psychopathology (e.g., depression, De Raedt et 
al., 2006; post-traumatic stress disorder, Lee, 2009).  
One possible explanation for the differences found in explicit but not implicit 
self-esteem is offered when we consider the potentially different processes 
underlying their development. Zeigler-Hill (2001) proposes the possibility that 
implicit self-esteem reflects accumulated social evaluations, whereas explicit self-
esteem may reflect the conscious interpretation (or even re-interpretation) of these 
experiences. If this is true, we might expect high and low socially anxious 
participants to differ in terms of explicit self-esteem, because it is likely to be 
affected by the biased information processing (e.g., post-event processing and 
rumination) that maintains social anxiety, but does not characterise low socially 
anxious individuals (e.g., Mellings & Alden, 2000). However, if the processing of 
information contributing to implicit self-esteem is not subject to the same level of 
interpretation or re-interpretation, we could hypothesise that difference between high 
and low socially anxious individuals would be less likely. These ideas are clearly a 
theoretical supposition and research is essential to examine this hypothesis.   
The effect of image valence on self-concept clarity is more complex. The 
main effect of social anxiety on self-concept clarity is consistent with previous 
research (Moscovitch et al., 2009; Stopa et al., in prep; Wilson & Rapee, 2006); high 
socially anxious participants demonstrated lower levels of clarity, compared to low 94 
 
socially anxious participants. This reduced clarity in the high socially anxious group 
indicates that uncertainty of self-concept has a potentially maintaining role in social 
anxiety. However, we also found an interaction between social anxiety and imagery 
which indicated that negative imagery was associated with reduced self-concept 
clarity, but only in low socially anxious participants. A number of studies have 
highlighted a relationship between self-esteem and self-concept clarity, such that low 
self-esteem is associated with lower clarity of self-concept than high self-esteem 
(e.g., Campbell, 1990; Campbell, Chew, & Scratchley, 1991; Campbell & Fehr, 
1990). Therefore, this finding is difficult to explain in light of the effect of image 
valence on self-esteem in this study. One possible explanation is that high socially 
anxious individuals are characterised by chronically low levels of self-concept clarity 
which may be more resistant to change than in low socially anxious individuals. It is 
possible that longer-term training in the generation of positive images in high 
socially anxious individuals may produce effects similar to that observed in the low 
socially anxious group. An alternative explanation can be offered by considering the 
effects of the specific images themselves. If negative images reduce clarity, but 
positive images do not increase clarity, it is possible that the lack of difference 
between the imagery conditions for high socially anxious participants may be due to 
a floor effect, i.e., participants’ levels of clarity could not be reduced enough to show 
a significant difference between groups. The lack of a neutral imagery condition 
precludes a test of this proposition, which is merely speculative at this stage.  
If manipulation of imagery does not influence self-concept clarity in high 
socially anxious individuals, we need to consider possible clinical implications of 
this finding. Self-concept clarity appears to differentiate between high and low 95 
 
socially anxious individuals, with lower levels of clarity found in high socially 
anxious participants (Stopa et al., in prep; Wilson & Rapee, 2006). If low levels of 
clarity play a maintaining role in social anxiety they may require targeting in 
treatment. Recent treatment advances targeting the distorted self-images in social 
phobia (e.g., video feedback and imagery rescripting) appear to be effective, but we 
do not know whether they impact on self-concept clarity. If, as this study suggests, it 
may not be possible to increase clarity through manipulation of self-imagery, then 
identification of treatment techniques that do influence this component of self could 
be important. Further research is needed to assess the influence of this component of 
self on the persistence of social anxiety and it would be useful to begin to assess the 
impact of current treatment techniques on this potential vulnerability factor. In 
addition, there is a need for future research to consider the extent to which the clarity 
of self-concept (i.e., low clarity versus high clarity) interacts with the content of self-
concept (i.e., a primarily positive versus a primarily negative self-concept). For 
example, in what way might an unstable and unclear self-concept (proposed to be 
characteristic in social phobia) be more maladaptive than a stable but negative self-
concept? One way to begin to unpick this issue would be for future studies to attempt 
to measure both clarity and content of the self, and to explore the interaction between 
these construct on a range of outcome variables including cognitive, affective, 
behavioural and personality factors associated with psychological well-being and 
distress.  
The second aim of this study was to investigate whether positive and negative 
self-images affect the experience of self during a social threat task (Cyberball). The 
results suggest that participants did not feel completely accepted by the other players 96 
 
in the game, indicating that the experience of Cyberball contained an element of 
rejection. This provides some support for its use as a social threat activation task and 
highlights the potential utility of this task as a useful research tool for examining 
social evaluative concerns and/or behaviours that may be reinforced online (e.g., 
through social networking sites and online gaming). The experience of self was 
measured using participants’ feelings of self-esteem, control, sense of belonging and 
meaningful existence (Zadro et al., 2006). Unfortunately, due to the poor reliability 
of the belonging and meaningful existence subscales, analysis of these variables 
could not be reliably reported.  The main effect of social anxiety on explicit self-
esteem during social threat activation is consistent with the findings in the first part 
of this study. Both before and during social threat activation, high socially anxious 
participants demonstrated lower levels of self-esteem, compared to low socially 
anxious participants. However, it appeared that the difference observed could be 
explained by differences in participants' levels of depression. Depression was used as 
a covariate so that the contribution of social phobia on levels of self-esteem could be 
explored separately from depression.  However, as social phobia shares high levels 
of comorbidity with depressive symptomology (e.g., Kessler, Stang, Wittchen, Stein, 
& Walters, 1999; Merikangas & Angst, 1995), the experience of depression and 
social phobia may not be entirely distinct. Therefore, it could be argued that it is 
somewhat artificial, and not clinically relevant, to statistically separate them (Miller 
& Chapman, 2001). In interpreting the effects of depression and social anxiety in 
isolation, we may be in danger of losing clinically relevant information. 
The main effect of imagery on explicit self-esteem is also consistent with the 
results within the first part of the study and provides some support for the proposition 97 
 
that the increase in self-esteem associated with positive imagery can be maintained in 
the face of social threat
12. The differential impact of image valence provides indirect 
support for Clark and Wells’ suggestion that self-images are one form of information 
used by individuals with social phobia to evaluate performance (i.e., more positive 
images were associated with more positive self-evaluations during threat activation). 
Although this is an important finding, given the proposed maintaining role of post-
event processing in contributing to individuals’ negative evaluations and judgements 
of performance (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997), it would seem even more important to now explore the stability of 
these effects (i.e., measuring self-esteem immediately following threat activation and 
following a time delay).  
The lack of main effect of either social anxiety or image valence on 
participants’ sense of control during social threat is in contrast to our initial 
hypotheses. We therefore need to consider why we failed to find these effects. One 
possible explanation is offered by a recent study exploring the factors underlying the 
observed effects of the Cyberball task. Preliminary findings by Jacoby and 
Sassenberg (2009) indicated that once the social aspect of the Cyberball task had 
been removed, the effects of exclusion on self-esteem and belonging were no longer 
                                                           
12 There were significant correlations between explicit negative self-esteem (r=-.508, p<.001) and 
explicit positive self-esteem (r=.399, p<.001), and levels of explicit self-esteem following social 
threat. This provides some support for the proposition that the increase in explicit self-esteem 
associated with positive imagery prior to social threat activation continues in the face of social threat 
e.g., higher levels of explicit self-esteem, prior to Cyberball, were associated with higher levels of 
explicit self-esteem following Cyberball. There was no significant correlation between implicit self-
esteem and explicit self-esteem following social threat (r=.144, p=.181). This is perhaps unsurprising 
given evidence indicating a low correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem (Bosson, Swann, 
& Pennebaker, 2000). Future studies should examine the extent to which individual differences in 
response to positive imagery predicts self-esteem. 
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present, although the effects on control and meaningful existence remained. They 
therefore suggest that only the effects of ostracism on self-esteem and belonging are 
determined by the social aspect of exclusion inherent in the task. If this is true, we 
might not propose a difference in feelings of control, although we would anticipate a 
main effect of social anxiety on self-esteem (due to its association with the social 
threat implicit in the task). It is also worth noting that previous research has 
highlighted the universal effects of total exclusion. To date, none of the factors 
investigated
13, including social anxiety (Zadro et al., 2006), have been found to 
moderate the immediate effect of total exclusion on self-esteem, control, belonging 
and meaningful existence. In this study, a less severe form of exclusion was used and 
results indicate that social anxiety may potentially moderate the effects of exclusion 
on self-esteem. It is possible that we have established a baseline condition where 
other variables (i.e., social anxiety) are beginning to influence the effects of 
exclusion. The effects of partial exclusion may not be universal and self-esteem, 
control, belonging and meaningful existence may all be differently affected by the 
experience.  
We also failed to find main effects for social anxiety or image valence on 
positive affect, which is again inconsistent with our hypothesis and is in contrast to 
previous research which reported a relationship between negative images and an 
increase in negative affect (e.g., state anxiety, Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; 
Hirsch, Meynen et al., 2004). It is possible that the use of a general measure of 
positive affect rather than a specific measure of anxiety (as used within the other 
                                                           
13 Research has so far found that self-esteem (Williams et al., 2000), attribution for ostracism, and the 
identity of the source of ostracism (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007; Zadro et al., 2004), do not 
moderate the effects of exclusion.  99 
 
studies) may account for these differences. We chose to remain consistent with the 
previous Cyberball social anxiety research and measured the effects of exclusion on 
the experience of self using the Cyberball questionnaire (Zadro et al., 2004). 
However, although this allows us to contribute to the limited evidence base on the 
effects of exclusion on social anxiety, it precludes direct comparison of the findings 
of this study with research exploring the role of negative self-images in social 
anxiety.  It would have been useful to repeat the measures of state anxiety, self-
esteem and self-concept clarity used to capture the experience of self prior to social 
threat activation. This would align this study with the literature on imagery and 
social anxiety and allow us to examine more consistently whether the effects of 
imagery on the experience of self were maintained in the face of social threat.  
Inevitably, this study has a number of limitations. The use of a non-clinical 
sample limits generalisability to a socially phobic population. The use of a between-
subjects design introduces the possibility that uncontrolled individual differences 
between groups may have accounted for observed effects. As participants were 
screened using the SIAS they may not have been fully blind to the subject of the 
study which may have influenced their response to self-report tasks that are subject 
to self-presentational concerns and impression management strategies (Farnham et 
al., 1999). In addition, the poor internal consistency of two of the fundamental need 
score scales prevent full exploration of the hypotheses in the second part of the study. 
The study would have benefited from asking participants to rate how much they were 
able to keep their self-image in mind during specific tasks such as the IAT and 
Cyberball. This would have provided the opportunity to explore the degree to which 
the presence of the self-image was impacting on the individual tasks in more detail. 100 
 
Inclusion of a neutral imagery condition would have been beneficial and would have 
allowed the assessment of the individual contribution of positive and negative image 
valence on the observed results. Finally, a strength of this study was that we were 
able to induce negative self-images in participants who were extremely low in social 
anxiety (SIAS < 9). However, it is possible that the images generated by these 
participants, although equivalent in vividness and duration held, were not 
comparable to those generated by high socially anxious participants in terms if image 
valence
14. To assess this criticism it would have been useful to formally examine the 
equivalence of imagery content and valence (in addition to duration and vividness). 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of this study have some 
potentially important implications for clinical practice. It appears that positive self-
images, which can be successfully manipulated and held in mind by highly socially 
anxious participants, are associated with more positive implicit self-esteem. They 
also appear to be associated with more positive and less negative explicit self-esteem 
than the negative images commonly reported in social phobia, an association that 
may remain in the face of social threat. These findings support the validity of 
targeting negative, and promoting positive, self-images in social phobia, as well as 
offering one possible explanation for the success of imagery rescripting in reducing 
symptomology in social phobia (see Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2007, 2008). 
                                                           
14 Within the current study, participants were asked to generate images based on events during which 
they rated their feelings of anxiety or relaxation at 60 of more on a scale of 0-100, where 0 represented 
either not at all anxious or not at all relaxed and 100 represented extremely anxious or extremely 
relaxed. However, exact ratings of anxiety or relaxation were not recorded and so it was not possible 
to formally compare the images generated in terms of affective valence.  
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Imagery rescripting involves a set of related processes directed at modifying a self-
image that represents a memory of a distressing and traumatic social event. It is 
possible that the positive self-images developed and rehearsed in therapy trigger a 
more positive working self. If, as Brewin (2006) suggests, multiple representations of 
self compete for retrieval, then the repeated activation of positive self-representations 
associated with manipulation of positive imagery in therapy is likely to increase the 
accessibility of these positive representations, thereby increasing their likelihood of 
winning the retrieval competition (in favour of negative self-representations). The 
increased accessibility of positive representations may influence the accessibility of 
information that has the potential to contradict and challenge the individual’s 
negative sense of self, and therefore has the potential to break one of the vicious 
cycles proposed to maintain social anxiety.   102 
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as cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT). The major focus is on the following: 
experimental analyses of psychopathological processes linked to prevention and 
treatment; the development and evaluation of empirically-supported interventions; 
predictors, moderators and mechanisms of behaviour change; and dissemination of 
evidence-based treatments to general clinical practice. In addition to traditional 
clinical disorders, the scope of the journal also includes behavioural medicine. The 
journal will not consider manuscripts dealing primarily with measurement, 
psychometric analyses, and personality assessment. 
 
The Editor and Associate Editors will make an initial determination of whether 
or not submissions fall within the scope of the journal and are of sufficient merit 
and importance to warrant full review.  
 
Submission to the journal prior to acceptance Authors should submit their articles 
electronically via the Elsevier Editorial System (EES) page of this journal 
http://ees.elsevier.com/brat. The system automatically converts source files to a 
single Adobe Acrobat PDF version of the article, which is used in the peer-review 
process. Please note that even though manuscript source files are converted to PDF at 
submission for the review process, these source files are needed for further 
processing after acceptance. All correspondence, including notification of the 
Editor's decision and requests for revision, takes place by e-mail and via the Author's 
homepage, removing the need for a hard-copy paper trail.  
 
Any questions regarding your submission should be addressed to the Editor in Chief, 
Professor G. T. Wilson, Psychological Clinic at Gordon Road, Rutgers, The State 
University of New Jersey, 41C Gordon Road, Piscataway, New Jersey, 08854-8067, 
USA. Email: brat@rci.rutgers.edu.  
 
Submission of an article implies that the work described has not been published 
previously (except in the form of an abstract or as part of a published lecture or 
academic thesis), that it is not under consideration for publication elsewhere, that its 
publication is approved by all authors and tacitly or explicitly by the responsible 
authorities where the work was carried out, and that, if accepted, it will not be 
published elsewhere in the same form, in English or in any other language, without 
the written consent of the Publisher.  
 
Presentation of manuscript Please write your text in good English (American or 
British usage is accepted, but not a mixture of these). Italics are not to be used for 
expressions of Latin origin, for example, in vivo, et al., per se. Use decimal points 119 
 
(not commas); use a space for thousands (10 000 and above). Print the entire 
manuscript on one side of the paper only, using double spacing and wide (3 cm) 
margins. (Avoid full justification, i.e., do not use a constant right-hand margin.) 
Ensure that each new paragraph is clearly indicated. Present tables and figure legends 
on separate pages at the end of the manuscript. If possible, consult a recent issue of 
the journal to become familiar with layout and conventions. Number all pages 
consecutively.  
 
Provide the following data on the title page (in the order given).  
 
Title. Concise and informative. Titles are often used in information-retrieval systems. 
Avoid abbreviations and formulae where possible.  
 
Author names and affiliations. Where the family name may be ambiguous (e.g., a 
double name), please indicate this clearly. Present the authors' affiliation addresses 
(where the actual work was done) below the names. Indicate all affiliations with a 
lower-case superscript letter immediately after the author's name and in front of the 
appropriate address. Provide the full postal address of each affiliation, including the 
country name, and, if available, the e-mail address of each author.  
 
Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who is willing to handle correspondence at 
all stages of refereeing and publication, also post-publication. Ensure that 
telephone and fax numbers (with country and area code) are provided in 
addition to the e-mail address and the complete postal address.  
 
Present/permanent address. If an author has moved since the work described in the 
article was done, or was visiting at the time, a 'Present address' (or 'Permanent 
address') may be indicated as a footnote to that author's name. The address at which 
the author actually did the work must be retained as the main, affiliation address. 
Superscript Arabic numerals are used for such footnotes.  
 
Abstract. A concise and factual abstract is required (maximum length 200 words). 
The abstract should state briefly the purpose of the research, the principal results and 
major conclusions. An abstract is often presented separate from the article, so it must 
be able to stand alone. References should therefore be avoided, but if essential, they 
must be cited in full, without reference to the reference list.  
 
Keywords. Immediately after the abstract, provide a maximum of 6 keywords, to be 
chosen from the APA list of index descriptors. These keywords will be used for 
indexing purposes.  
 
Abbreviations. Define abbreviations that are not standard in this field at their first 
occurrence in the article: in the abstract but also in the main text after it. Ensure 
consistency of abbreviations throughout the article.  
 
N.B. Acknowledgements. Collate acknowledgements in a separate section at the end 
of the article and do not, therefore, include them on the title page, as a footnote to the 
title or otherwise.  
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Shorter Communications This option is designed to allow publication of research 
reports that are not suitable for publication as regular articles. Shorter 
Communications are appropriate for articles with a specialized focus or of particular 
didactic value. Manuscripts should be between 3000 - 5000 words, and must not 
exceed the upper word limit. This limit includes the abstract, text, and references, but 
not the title pages, tables and figures.  
 
Arrangement of the article Divide your article into clearly defined sections with the 
use of headings (non-numbered). Any subsection may be given a brief heading. Each 
heading should appear on its own separate line. Use these headings for internal cross-
referencing: do not just refer to 'the text'.  
 
Appendices. If there is more than one appendix, they should be identified as A, B, 
etc. Formulae and equations in appendices should be given separate numbering: (Eq. 
A.1), (Eq. A.2), etc.; in a subsequent appendix, (Eq. B.1) and so forth.  
 
Acknowledgements. Place acknowledgements, including information on grants 
received, before the references, in a separate section, and not as a footnote on the title 
page.  
 
Figure legends, tables, figures, schemes. Present these, in this order, at the end of the 
article. They are described in more detail below. High-resolution graphics files must 
always be provided separate from the main text file (see Preparation of illustrations).  
 
Specific remarks Tables. Number tables consecutively in accordance with their 
appearance in the text. Place footnotes to tables below the table body and indicate 
them with superscript lowercase letters. Avoid vertical rules. Be sparing in the use of 
tables and ensure that the data presented in tables do not duplicate results described 
elsewhere in the article.  
 
Preparation of supplementary data. Elsevier accepts supplementary material to 
support and enhance your scientific research. Supplementary files offer the author 
additional possibilities to publish supporting applications, movies, animation 
sequences, high-resolution images, background datasets, sound clips and more. 
Supplementary files supplied will be published online alongside the electronic 
version of your article in Elsevier Web products, including ScienceDirect: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com. In order to ensure that your submitted material is 
directly usable, please ensure that data is provided in one of our recommended file 
formats. Authors should submit the material in electronic format together with the 
article and supply a concise and descriptive caption for each file. For more detailed 
instructions please visit our artwork instruction pages at 
http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions.  
 
References Responsibility for the accuracy of bibliographic citations lies entirely 
with the authors  
 
Citations in the text: Please ensure that every reference cited in the text is also 
present in the reference list (and vice versa). Any references cited in the abstract 
must be given in full. Unpublished results and personal communications should not 121 
 
be in the reference list, but may be mentioned in the text. Citation of a reference as 
'in press' implies that the item has been accepted for publication.  
 
Citing and listing of web references. As a minimum, the full URL should be given. 
Any further information, if known (author names, dates, reference to a source 
publication, etc.), should also be given. Web references can be listed separately (e.g., 
after the reference list) under a different heading if desired, or can be included in the 
reference list.  
 
Text: Citations in the text should follow the referencing style used by the American 
Psychological Association. You are referred to the Publication Manual of the 
American Psychological Association, Fifth Edition, ISBN 1-55798-790-4, copies of 
which may be ordered from http://www.apa.org/books/4200061.html or APA Order 
Dept., P.O.B. 2710, Hyattsville, MD 20784, USA or APA, 3 Henrietta Street, 
London, WC3E 8LU, UK. Details concerning this referencing style can also be 
found at http://humanities.byu.edu/linguistics/Henrichsen/APA/APA01.html.  
 
List: References should be arranged first alphabetically and then further sorted 
chronologically if necessary. More than one reference from the same author(s) in the 
same year must be identified by the letters "a", "b", "c", etc., placed after the year of 
publication.  
 
Examples: Reference to a journal publication: Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J. A. J., & 
Lupton R. A. (2000). The art of writing a scientific article. Journal of Scientific 
Communications, 163, 51-59.  
 
Reference to a book: Strunk, W., Jr., & White, E. B. (1979). The elements of style. 
(3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan, (Chapter 4).  
 
Reference to a chapter in an edited book: Mettam, G. R., & Adams, L. B. (1994). 
How to prepare an electronic version of your article. In B. S. Jones, & R. Z. Smith 
(Eds.), Introduction to the electronic age (pp. 281-304). New York: E-Publishing Inc.  
 
Note that journal names are not to be abbreviated.  
 
Preparation of illustrations  
 
Submitting your artwork in an electronic format helps us to produce your work to the 
best possible standards, ensuring accuracy, clarity and a high level of detail.  
 
General points  
• Always supply high-quality printouts of your artwork, in case conversion of the 
electronic artwork is problematic. 
• Make sure you use uniform lettering and sizing of your original artwork. 
• Save text in illustrations as "graphics" or enclose the font.  
• Only use the following fonts in your illustrations: Arial, Courier, Helvetica, Times, 
Symbol. 
• Number the illustrations according to their sequence in the text. 
• Use a logical naming convention for your artwork files, and supply a separate 122 
 
listing of the files and the software used. 
• Provide all illustrations as separate files and as hardcopy printouts on separate 
sheets.  
• Provide captions to illustrations separately. 
• Produce images near to the desired size of the printed version.  
 
For more detailed instructions please visit our artwork instruction pages at 
http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions. You are urged to visit this site; some 
excerpts from the detailed information are given here.  
 
Formats Regardless of the application used, when your electronic artwork is 
finalised, please "save as" or convert the images to one of the following formats 
(Note the resolution requirements for line drawings, halftones, and line/halftone 
combinations given below.):  
 
EPS: Vector drawings. Embed the font or save the text as "graphics". 
TIFF: Colour or greyscale photographs (halftones): always use a minimum of 300 
dpi.  
TIFF: Bitmapped line drawings: use a minimum of 1000 dpi. 
TIFF: Combinations bitmapped line/half-tone (colour or greyscale): a minimum of 
500 dpi is required. 
DOC, XLS or PPT: If your electronic artwork is created in any of these 
Microsoft Office applications please supply "as is".  
 
Line drawings Supply high-quality printouts on white paper produced with black 
ink. The lettering and symbols, as well as other details, should have proportionate 
dimensions, so as not to become illegible or unclear after possible reduction; in 
general, the figures should be designed for a reduction factor of two to three. The 
degree of reduction will be determined by the Publisher. Illustrations will not be 
enlarged. Consider the page format of the journal when designing the illustrations. 
Photocopies are not suitable for reproduction. Do not use any type of shading on 
computer-generated illustrations.  
 
Photographs (halftones) Please supply original photographs for reproduction, 
printed on glossy paper, very sharp and with good contrast. Remove non-essential 
areas of a photograph. Do not mount photographs unless they form part of a 
composite figure. Where necessary, insert a scale bar in the illustration (not below 
it), as opposed to giving a magnification factor in the legend. Note that photocopies 
of photographs are not acceptable.  
 
Copyright Upon acceptance of an article, authors will be asked to sign a ?Journal 
Publishing Agreement?? (for more information on this and copyright see 
http://www.elsevier.com/copyright). Acceptance of the agreement will ensure the 
widest possible dissemination of information. An e-mail (or letter) will be sent to the 
corresponding author confirming receipt of the manuscript together with a `Journal 
Publishing Agreement? form or a link to the online version of this agreement. 
If excerpts from other copyrighted works are included, the author(s) must obtain 
written permission from the copyright owners and credit the source(s) in the article. 
Elsevier has preprinted forms for use by authors in these cases: contact Elsevier?s 123 
 
Rights Department, Oxford, UK: phone (+44) 1865 843830, fax (+44) 1865 853333, 
e-mail permissions@elsevier.com. Requests may also be completed online via the 
Elsevier homepage (  http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissions).  
 
Proofs When your manuscript is received by the Publisher it is considered to be in its 
final form. Proofs are not to be regarded as 'drafts'. One set of page proofs will be 
sent to the corresponding author, to be checked for typesetting/editing. No changes 
in, or additions to, the accepted (and subsequently edited) manuscript will be allowed 
at this stage. Proofreading is solely your responsibility. The Publisher reserves the 
right to proceed with publication if corrections are not communicated. Return 
corrections within 3 days of receipt of the proofs. Should there be no corrections, 
please confirm this.  
 
Offprints Twenty-five offprints will be supplied free of charge. Additional offprints 
and copies of the issue can be ordered at a specially reduced rate using the order 
form sent to the corresponding author after the manuscript has been accepted. Orders 
for reprints (produced after publication of an article) will incur a 50% surcharge.  
 
 
NIH voluntary posting policy  
US National Institutes of Health (NIH) voluntary posting (" Public Access") policy 
Elsevier facilitates author response to the NIH voluntary posting request (referred to 
as the NIH "Public Access Policy", see 
http://www.nih.gov/about/publicaccess/index.htm) by posting the peer-reviewed 
author's manuscript directly to PubMed Central on request from the author, 12 
months after formal publication. Upon notification from Elsevier of acceptance, we 
will ask you to confirm via e-mail (by e-mailing us at 
NIHauthorrequest@elsevier.com) that your work has received NIH funding and that 
you intend to respond to the NIH policy request, along with your NIH award number 
to facilitate processing. Upon such confirmation, Elsevier will submit to PubMed 
Central on your behalf a version of your manuscript that will include peer-review 
comments, for posting 12 months after formal publication. This will ensure that you 
will have responded fully to the NIH request policy. There will be no need for you to 
post your manuscript directly with PubMed Central, and any such posting is 
prohibited. 124 
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Negative Self-Imagery Script 
In a minute I am going to be asking you if you if you ever get anxious in social situations? Is that 
something that ever happens to you? Usually when people are very anxious a mixture of thoughts and 
images or fleeting pictures go through their minds.  I’m going to try and help you get hold of the 
image and general sense of yourself you have when you are anxious.   
Can you think of a time when you felt particularly 
anxious in a social situation? 
 
Ensure it is a social anxiety (i.e. not anxiety 
experienced alone must be a social aspect). May 
have to probe to clarify – what was it that you were 
anxious about in that situation if ambiguous.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How anxious were you at the worst moment on a scale of 0 not at all to 100 extremely anxious?  
Choose another situation if it is not above 60% 
Did you have an image or picture going through your mind at that time?                                              
Yes/No 
If not then ask: - Did you have a negative sense of yourself in the situation?                                        
Yes/No 
If no then identify another situation. 
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When identified (Note: you are now looking to recreate the image of the situation now) 
Please could you close your eyes and try to recall the situation and then recreate the image you have 
of yourself [or the sense of yourself] in the situation, making it as vivid as possible. (Allow about 30 
seconds)  
Have you got it now? When they say “yes” ask: - I 
am going to ask you about the situation and the 
image/ sense of yourself. What’s happening? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are you doing? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summarise 
What do you look like to other people?   
 
Describe. If focussed on appearance probe for 
details of 
posture, facial aspects, other parts of the body, 
general appearance, any change in size. 
 
Account must be detailed enough for a film director 
to recreate the image. Summarise and check if each 
bit is right and get more detail on each aspect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you sound like to other people? (voice 
characteristics, pronunciation etc...).  
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Do you have any sensations in your body? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So you have got this image in your mind’s eye.  
How are you feeling? 
 
 
How do you think you are coming across to other 
people? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do full summary of all. Vignette of it all 'you are a red faced person who looks anxious and 
awkward……. 
 
How vivid is the image/ strong is the sense of yourself on a scale of 0 to 100 (0 = not at all vivid/not at 
all strong; 100 = extremely vivid/strong)  
If less than 60% go back and get more detail.  
 
Please keep hold of the image/ sense of yourself and open your eyes. I’d like you to try to keep hold 
of the image in your mind as you are completing all the other tasks. I will prompt you as we go 
through the task to remind you. Also if you notice the image fading away try to bring it back to mind.  128 
 
Positive Self-Imagery Script 
In a minute I am going to be asking you about times when you have felt relaxed in a social situation. 
Usually when people are very relaxed people have a positive sense of themselves or an image of 
themselves in their mind while they are in the situation. I’m going to try and help you get hold of the 
image and general sense of yourself you have when you are relaxed.   
Can you think of a time when you felt particularly 
relaxed in a social situation? 
 
Prompt if they say no this may be when you have 
been with friend or family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How relaxed were you at your most relaxed moment on a scale of 0 not at all to 100 extremely 
relaxed?  
Choose another situation if it is not above 60% 
Did you have an image or picture going through your mind at that time?                                              
Yes/No 
If not then ask: - Did you have a positive sense of yourself in the situation?                                        
Yes/No 
If no then identify another situation. 
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When identified (Note: you are now looking to recreate the image of the situation now) 
Please could you close your eyes and try to recall the situation and then recreate the image you have 
of yourself [or the sense of yourself] in the situation, making it as vivid as possible. (Allow about 30 
seconds)  
Have you got it now? When they say “yes” ask: - I 
am going to ask you about the situation and the 
image/ sense of yourself. What’s happening? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are you doing? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summarise 
What do you look like to other people?   
 
Describe. If focussed on appearance probe for 
details of 
posture, facial aspects, other parts of the body, 
general appearance, any change in size. 
 
 
Account must be detailed enough for a film director 
to recreate the image. Summarise and check if each 
bit is right and get more detail on each aspect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you sound like to other people? (voice 
characteristics, pronunciation etc...).  
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Do you have any sensations in your body? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So you have got this image in your mind’s eye.  
How are you feeling? 
 
 
How do you think you are coming across to other 
people? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do full summary of all. Vignette of it all 'you are relaxed person who is part of the group and looks 
relaxed and happy……. 
 
How vivid is the image/ strong is the sense of yourself on a scale of 0 to 100 (0 = not at all vivid/not at 
all strong; 100 = extremely vivid/strong)  
If less than 60% go back and get more detail.  
 
Please keep hold of the image/ sense of yourself and open your eyes. I’d like you to try to keep hold 
of the image in your mind as you are completing all the other tasks. I will prompt you as we go 
through the task to remind you. Also if you notice the image fading away try to bring it back to mind.  131 
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Cyberball Questionnaire  
1.  What percent of the throws were thrown to you? 
 
 
2.  To what extent were you included by the other participants during the game? 
Accepted                Rejected 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
Please rate the extent to which the following statements apply to you?  
3.  I felt poorly accepted by the other participants 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
4.  I felt as though I had made a “connection” or bonded with one or more of the 
participants during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
5.  I felt like an outsider during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
6.  I felt that I was able to throw the ball as often as I wanted during the game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
7.  I felt somewhat frustrated during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
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8.  I felt in control during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
9.  During the Cyberball game, I felt good about myself 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
10. I felt that the other participants failed to perceive me as a worthy and likeable 
person 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
11. I felt somewhat inadequate during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
12. I felt that my performance [e.g., catching the ball, deciding whom to throw the 
ball to] had some effect on the direction of the game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
13. I felt non-existent during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
14. I felt as though my existence was meaningless during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 134 
 
15. I felt....... 
Bad                Good 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
Happy                Sad 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
Tense                Relaxed 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
Aroused                Not aroused 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
16. I felt angry during the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
17. I enjoyed playing the Cyberball game 
Not at all                Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E: Participant Information Sheet 136 
 
Information Sheet 
IMAGERY STUDY 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decided whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
is involved. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 
the researcher if you wish. Do not hesitate to ask if there is anything which is not clear, or 
if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take 
part. Thank you for reading this.  
 
I am Natalie Hulme, a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University of Southampton.  I am 
requesting your participation in a study which is investigating imagery and mental 
visualisation.   
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely up to you whether or not to take part. Your participation is voluntary and you 
may withdraw your participation at any time. If you agree to participate you will be asked to 
sign a consent form. If you choose to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving reason. A decision to withdraw or a decision not to take part will not affect 
your grades or treatment as a student in the psychology department. 
 
What will happen to me if I decide to take part? 
If you decide to take part you will be asked to participate in a guided imagery exercise 
during which the researcher will help you to generate and describe an image held in your 
mind. You will also be asked to complete a series of short questionnaires and a computer 
based word sorting task. The final part of the study involves playing an online computer 
game with three other participants. The whole study will take up to one hour.  
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential?  
Yes. Personal information will not be released to or viewed by anyone other than researcher 
involved in this project. All data will be stored in an anonymous format and the results of 
this study will not include your name or any other identifying characteristics.   
 
What will happen to the results of the research? 
The results of this study will be written up and submitted as part of my doctorate. A brief 
summary of the results can also be sent to you on request. It is also hoped that the results will 
be written up for publication in a psychological journal.   137 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by the School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee, 
University of Southampton.  
 
If you have any questions please ask them now, or contact me Natalie Hulme on 
nlh106@soton.ac.uk 
 
 
Signature                                 Date 
 
 
Name    Natalie Hulme 
 
 
Version 1 (22/02/08) 138 
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STATEMENT OF CONSENT: IMAGERY STUDY 
 
I                                                   (print name) have read the above information sheet.  
 
•  I understand that I may withdraw my consent and discontinue participation at any 
time without penalty or loss of benefit to myself.   
 
•  I understand that data collected as part of this research project will be treated 
confidentially, and that published results of this research project will maintain my 
confidentially.   
 
•  In signing this consent letter, I am not waiving my legal claims, rights, or remedies.   
 
•  A copy of this consent letter will be offered to me. 
 
Please circle Yes or No to the following items 
 
1  I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet  
for the above named study dated 22/02/08 (Version 1) 
 
Yes  No 
2  I give consent to participate in the above study  Yes  No 
 
 
Signature_____________________________                     Date_________________ 
 
Name (please print)___________________________     
 
I understand that if I have questions about my rights as a participant in this research, or if I 
feel that I have been placed at risk, I can contact the Chair of the Ethics Committee, 
Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ. Phone:  
(023) 8059 5578. 
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DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
Imagery and the Self 
 
Aims of the Study 
Research suggests that imagery plays a critical role in the development (Hirsch, Matthews, 
Clark, Williams & Morrison, 2006) and maintenance of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 
1995). The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between imagery and the self 
in relation to social anxiety.  
The study included individuals who expressed both above and above average levels of 
anxiety in relation to social situations. You were asked to participate as you expressed 
above/below average levels of anxiety as measured by the initial screening questionnaire 
(Social Interaction Anxiety Scale: Mattick & Clark, 1998).  
Within the study, half of the people participating were asked to generate and describe a 
positive self-image and the other half were helped to generate a negative self-image.  The 
aim was to assess the impact of the use of positive and negative imagery on attitudes to self 
and on reaction to a socially ambiguous task (i.e., a game in which you were not sure how 
much you were being included by the other players).  
The questionnaires and word sorting task were designed to measure attitudes to self. We 
were specifically interested on the impact of the imagery on self-esteem (which represents an 
evaluative attitude to oneself) and self-concept clarity (which represents the consistency with 
which to attitudes to oneself are held).  Lower self-esteem and self-concept clarity have both 
been found to be associated with social anxiety.   
The computer game was designed to evoke feelings of social ambiguity and potential social 
isolation. The other ‘participants’ were in fact computer generated characters who were 
programmed to only include you a certain percentage of the time. It is expected that positive 
imagery may result in more positive attitudes to the self (so higher self-esteem) and increase 
the consistency with which these attitudes are held. Additionally, it is predicted that positive 
imagery may act as a buffer against the negative impact of perceived social threat.  
Your data will help our understanding of the relationship between imagery and the self in 
individuals who express above and below average anxiety in relation to social situations. 
Techniques specifically targeting negative self-images in socially anxious individuals show 
promising results. Preliminary evidence supports the use of rescripting negative images (a 
therapeutic technique) as a means of reducing image associated distress, modifying beliefs 
about the self encapsulated by the image and reducing anxiety (Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 
2007). However, it is not clear how imagery rescripting works. It is therefore critical to 
expand our understanding of the role of imagery within social anxiety as this may have 
implication for clinical practice. 
Confidentiality  
Once again results of this study will not include your name or any other identifying 
characteristics.  The research did use a degree of deception in that the exact nature of the 
study was not fully explained. This was done in order to prevent any response bias in 142 
 
participant behaviour. If you wish to withdraw your data from this study you may do so 
without cause or penalty. Please simply inform the researcher now or contact them using the 
details below.   
Results 
The results will be written up and submitted as part of my doctorate. It is also hope that the 
study will be written up and submitted for publication in a peer review journal. The data 
relating to self-compassion will be written up as an undergraduate dissertation at Brunel 
University. Findings will be summarised and will not identify any individual. A brief 
summary of the findings will be available on request. This will be available from July 2009 
and can be requested by leaving a message for Natalie Hulme on 02380 595 321, or by 
emailing nlh106@soton.ac.uk. If you have any further questions please contact me using the 
number or email address above.  
Your Response to Testing 
If anything that you have been asked to do has caused you to experience strong, negative 
emotions which you are having difficulty coping with, there are a number of sources of 
support to which you can turn: 
1.  Contact your general practitioner (GP) 
 
2.   You can contact the University of Southampton counselling service at 28 
University Road, Highfield, Southampton, SO17 1BJ. Tel: 02380593719 
(internal 23719) Email: counser@soton.ac.uk  
 
3.  Social anxiety is a normal experience. Some people have higher levels of social 
anxiety than others. If you feel that it is a significant problem for you, for 
example, if you feel that your anxiety prevents you from doing things on a 
regular basis, then there are various forms of help that you can access: 
a.  Butler, G. (1999). Overcoming Social Anxiety: A Self-help Guide Using 
Cognitive Behavioural Techniques. This is a self-help guide to 
understanding and overcoming social anxiety.  
b.  www.social-anxiety.org.uk is a website which provides information 
about social anxiety and support available.  
c.  www.phobics-society.org.uk  is a website for the largest charity (The 
Phobic Society) which provides support and help for people with social 
anxiety.  
d.  Triumph over Phobia (TOP) runs a national network of self-help groups 
to help people with (social) phobia (and obsessive compulsive disorder) 
to overcome their problems using graded self-exposure. There is a TOP 
self-help group in Southampton. For information on TOP, try 
www.triumpoverphobia.com, telephone 08456009601, or e-mail 
info@triumphoverphobia.com. 
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Thank you for your participation in this research. 
 
Signature ______________________________         Date __________________ 
 
Name___________________________________ 
If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this research, or if you feel that 
you have been placed at risk, you may contact the Chair of the Ethics Committee, 
Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ. Phone:  
(023) 8059 5578. 144 
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